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CHAPTER L 
INTRODUCTION 
Definition of the Problem 
Much has been written on the theoretical and practical implications 
of minimum wage legislation; how does this legislation affect the struc­
ture of wages, the level of distribution of employment, and the distribu­
tion of income? The results of the major studies by Rosters and Welch, 
(20), Gramlich (14), and Mincer (23) indicate that teenage employment and 
labor force participation are adversely affected by Tm'm'mnm wages. How­
ever, these studies are not consistent in the evaluation of the impact 
of minimum wages on the female labor force. This inconsistency, as well 
as the increasing importance of the adult female labor force, suggest 
the need for further analysis of the impact of this legislation on the 
employment and labor force participation of adult women. To what extent 
are adult women similar to the unskilled and inexperienced teenagers in 
their vulnerability to Tm'm'immi wage legislation? Does the displacement 
of workers result in the higher unemployment and lower labor force par­
ticipation of adult women or is the employment of adult women augmented 
by the displacement of teenage workers? If the employment and labor 
force participation of adult women are indeed affected by this legisla­
tion, is the effect indiscriminate or differential? In other words, 
does any age or racial or marital status group bear a greater burden or 
benefit from the legislation? 
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The need for analysis of the impact of minimum wage legislation 
on the adult female labor force also calls for analysis of the deter­
minants of the employment and labor force participation of adult women; 
how does the husband's income, family responsibilities, and the avail­
ability of welfare influence the adult women's employment and labor 
force participation? Although much research has been done using cross-
sectional analysis, there are relatively few time series studies. 
General Objectives 
Since the existing literature does not draw any clear conclusion 
with respect to the impact of minimum wage legislation on the adult 
female labor force, the major objective of this research is to fill this 
void. 
The initial framework for this analysis will be to combine the 
existing theoretical and empirical knowledge of minimum wages and the 
labor force participation of adult women to theoretically analyze the 
effect of the wage differential and displacement, which are created by 
the legislation, on the labor force participation and employment of 
adult women. This framework will then be used to construct an empirical 
model to estimate the impact of minimum wages on the adult female labor 
force. 
The initial empirical analysis will draw heavily on existing 
empirical models and approaches, using a limited set of variables to 
control for variations in employment and labor force participation of 
adult women. The objectives of this empirical section are to attempt 
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to reconcile the results of the previous minimum wage studies by 
estimating similar quarterly time series models. 
The second empirical section will attempt to expand upon the 
existing literature by controlling for a more inclusive set of economic 
and demographic determinants of female employment and labor force par­
ticipation. The objectives of this section are to evaluate whether a 
better specified model alters the estimated impact of minimum wages. 
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CHAPTER II. 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
An understanding of the impact of minimum wage legislation on the 
female employment and labor force participation decision requires some 
understanding of the female's labor supply decision as well as the impact 
of minimum wages. 
Both theoretical and empirical studies of the determinants of the 
adult female labor force participation decision have demonstrated the 
importance of the wage rate as well as family size, job opportunities, 
household technology, and social attitudes. In general, higher wages 
tend to draw women into the labor force; the substitution effect of a 
wage increase dominates the income effect. Since minimum wage legisla­
tion alters the structure of wages, such legislation should have an im­
pact on both the labor force participation and employment of adult women. 
The primary studies of the female labor supply decision are those 
done by Bowen and Finegan (6), Ashenfelter and Heckman (2), and Gronau 
(15). Other studies by Deutermann and Brown (10), Morgenstem and 
Hamovitch (25), and Jones and Long (18) consider the determinants of 
full time and part time employment. 
The impact of minimum wages on employment and labor force partici­
pation is considered in studies by Kosters and Welch (20), Mincer (23), 
and Gramlich (14). 
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Major Empirical Studies of the Female Labor Force 
Participation Decision 
Looking first at the studies of the labor supply decision, Bowen 
and Finegan's (6) study considers the demographic and labor market 
characteristics that influence the female labor force participation. 
Their study divides women into two groups, married and single, and em­
pirically tests the determinants of each group's labor force participa­
tion decision by analyzing cross-sectional data. 
For single women and married women, the determinants include the 
demographic characteristics of age, color, education, occupation and 
other income. For married women, the demographic characteristics also 
include the presence of children, the occupation of the husband. 
The labor market characteristics are the rate of uneaçloyment, the female 
wage, the husband's wage, the wage in the domestic service industry, a 
measure of the availability of female-type jobs, and the relative popula­
tion size of females. 
For both married and single women, the estimated relationship of 
the labor force participation rate is positive with respect to education 
and age, the female wage rate and industry mix, and is negative with 
respect to other income, and the domestic service wage rate. For mar­
ried women, the labor force participation rate is also negatively related 
to the presence of young children. Finally, the labor force participa­
tion of women is negatively related to the unemployment rate; the dis­
couraged worker effect outweighs the added worker effect. 
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Other empirical results are that the nonwhite female labor force 
participation rate is higher than the white female rate, the labor force 
participation rate of women whose husbands are employed in either a 
professional or technical occupation is lower than other women; never 
married women have the highest labor force participation rate. 
The empirical results of the Bowen and Finegan (6) study point 
out the various demographic and market characteristics that will in­
fluence the female labor supply decision. However, the relationship 
between the female labor force participation and the unemployment sug­
gested by this study is not unambiguous. As suggested by Barnes and 
Jones (3), the discouraged worker effect of cyclical unemployment 
dominates the labor force participation of adult women because house­
hold production is viewed as an alternative to market work. During a 
recessionary period when the availability of jobs declines, women with­
draw from the labor force and substitute home work for market work. 
However, the Mitchell (24) study suggests that the negative relationship 
between the labor force participation rate and unemployment is a charac­
teristic of cross-sectional studies and that the positive relationship 
suggested by the time series studies more accurately reflects the 
cyclical response to unemployment. Mitchell (24) contends that the 
added worker effect is the cyclical response to unemployment so that 
during recessionary periods, adult women enter the labor force to seek 
employment as a way of supplementing or replacing the primary source of 
income. 
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To examine the differences in the cross sectional and time series 
results, the Mitchell (24) study estimates both a time series and cross 
sectional labor force participation equation using a panel of cross-
section time-series data for 19 urban labor markets. The independent 
variables include the unemployment rate, a wage variable (either educa­
tional attainment or a full time female wage rate), the husband's in­
come, a demographic variable for fertility and age. The unemployment 
coefficients for the within-cities (time series) regressions are gener­
ally positive and some are significant, while the within-year (cross-
sectional) regression coefficients for unemployment are negative and not 
significant. For the pooled data, where city specific variables are 
included, the unemployment coefficients are positive and generally sig­
nificant. These results suggest the added worker effect is the dominant 
effect in the response to cyclical unemployment. 
Mitchell (24) also uses a time series analysis to examine the 
labor force participation response to differences in the average and 
current unemployment rate. The results indicate a rise in the female 
labor force participation rate when the current rate exceeds the average 
rate of unemployment. Cyclical unemployment induces women to enter the 
labor force and the negative relationship suggested by cross sectional 
studies is reflecting responses to specific labor market characteristics 
not responses to cyclical unençloyment. 
Both the Ashenfelter and Heckman (2) study and the Gronau (15) 
studies are models of the allocation of time. The Ashenfelter and 
Heckman (2) model analyzes the allocation of time of a family between 
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work and leisure, the Gronau (15) model analyzes the individual's allo­
cation of time among market work, household production, and leisure. 
The analysis of the allocation of time of a family by Ashenfelter 
and Heckman (2) is based on the maximization of a utility function that 
depends upon the husband's leisure time, the wife's leisure time and 
market goods and that is subject to a budget constraint and total time 
constraint. The hours of market work decision for the wife will depend 
not only upon her wage rate but also on her husband's wage rate. 
The empirical results of the Ashenfelter and Heckman (2) model 
indicate that the female labor supply decision is positive with respect 
to the female wage and inversely related to the husband's wage. 
Gronau (15) hypothesizes the allocation of time decision as a 
utility maximization problem; the individual maximizes a utility func­
tion that depends upon the consumption of commodity Z and is subject to 
a budget and time constraint. The commodity 2 is composed of goods and 
services; X, and leisure time; L. The goods and services may be either 
purchased in the market or produced at home. The household production 
of X is a function of time allocated to household production; H, and 
is subject to diminishing marginal productivity. Maximization requires 
equating the ratios of the marginal utilities of market goods, leisure, 
and household production time to the appropriate price ratios. 
Theoretically the effect of a change in the wage rate on the allo­
cation of time between work and leisure is ambiguous. Using a cross 
sectional data set of married white women, Gronau (15) empirically tests 
the relationship of one allocation of time to the presence of children. 
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unearned income, the husband's wage and education, the wife's age, 
education, work experience and expected wage rate. For women who allo­
cate their time among all three activities, the hours of market work 
are positively related to the expected wage rate and are negatively 
related to the level of unearned income, the husband's wage and educa­
tion, the wife's age and education, and the presence of children. The 
hours of leisure are negatively related to the presence of children and 
positively related to the other variables. The hours allocated to 
household production are negatively related to the expected wage rate 
and school age children and positively related to the other variables. 
The Gronau (15) study lends further support to the importance of 
the wife's wage rate, the husband's wage, other income, and the presence 
of children in explaining the labor supply decision of the adult female. 
Secondly, the negative relationship between the hours of market 
work and the presence of children indicated by Gronau's (15) research 
suggests that part-time employment is a possible outcome of this deci­
sion process. 
Major Empirical Studies of the Full~Time vs. Part-Time 
Work Decision 
Only recently have a few studies of the part-time work decision 
become available. Our understanding of this phenomenon is much more 
limited than that of the labor force participation. 
Deutermann and Brown (10) describe the characteristics of part-time 
workers; their study indicates that part-time employment has increased 
since 1954. The change in the composition of the labor force as well as 
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the growth in the service industry have generated this increase. The 
study suggests the major factors in choosing part-time work are enroll­
ment in an educational program, family responsibilities, and a prefer­
ence for leisure time. It also suggests that part-time workers tend to 
earn less per hour than full-time workers. Finally, married women are 
more likely to work part-time than either married men or single women 
and single women are no more likely to work part-time than are single 
men. 
The study by Morgenstem and Hamovitch (25) attempts to more fully 
explain why married women choose to work part-time. Using Census data 
for white women age 16-65, not enrolled, once married, husband present, 
and categorizing part-time work as less than 32 hours a week, their 
model estimates the contributions of the female's market productivity 
and household productivity, the husband's market productivity relative 
to the wife's and family income to annual hours worked (or weeks 
worked). The estimated coefficients for household productivity (pres­
ence of children under the age of 6) and the husband's income are 
negative while the estimated coefficients of the female wage rate are 
positive. Morgenstem and Hamovitch (25) also estimate the wage and 
income elasticities of the labor supply decision of married women. The 
wage elasticity of the labor supply decision of married women who work 
full-time is less than that of married women who work part-time. How­
ever, the income elasticity of the labor supply decision of married 
women who work full-time is greater than that of married women who work 
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part-time. Finally, the hours of work decision is more significantly 
influenced by the presence of children for women who work full-time 
than for women who work part-time. 
The Jones and Long (18) study examines four areas of the female 
allocation of time; the decision Co work part-time, the characteristics 
of part-time workers, the relationship between part-time work and the 
wage rate, and the nature of unemployment. Their study uses a theoret­
ical model of time allocation to construct and empirically analyze the 
characteristics of part-time workers. To examine how part-time work 
affects female wages, their study constructs a model based upon an 
assui:q>tion of most human capital models; that market wages depend upon 
employment experience as well as formal education. The analysis of the 
nature of unemployment is constructed from the time allocation model, 
the human capital model and a model of the jobs search process. The 
data sets were obtained from the National Longitudinal Survey tapes, 
and were for 6 year intervals. The empirical tests of the extent, 
characteristics, and incidences of unençloyment of part-time workers 
uses a multivariate probit analysis and the empirical test of the 
earnings of part-time workers uses a standard regression analysis. 
The characteristics of part-time work were analyzed by estimating 
the relationship of the work experience of the women to the earnings 
potential (the market wage rate, on-the-job training, health, race and 
the unemployment rate), the value of household production (the presence 
of children, the birth of a child, age, and education), characteristics 
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of the husband (income), net family assets, migration and the loss or 
presence of the husband. 
The results of this analysis indicate that the market wage rate, 
the presence of children, especially preschool age children, and the 
husband's income are negative. These coefficients suggest that the 
decision to work part-time is positively influenced by the presence of 
children and the husband's income but negatively influenced by the 
market wage rate. 
Jones and Long (18) also estimate the relationship between wages 
and part-time work by regressing the wage rate on the time periods of 
market work (distinguishing between full-time and part-time work), time 
periods of work in the home, education, health, migration, the presence 
of children, current employment (hours a week) and last years employment 
(weeks per year). The estimated coefficients for the time spent at 
part-time work are negatively related to the wage rate, indicating that 
the rate of return on work experience is less for women who work part-
time than for women who work full-time. 
Finally, Jones and Long (18) empirically test the relationship 
between unemployment and part-time work; how is the experience of un­
employment (incidence, spells, and duration) affected by part-time work, 
the expected wage (education and work experience), the opportunity cost 
of job search (presence of children), demand conditions (occupation or 
unemployment rate), the husband's income and migration. The results 
indicate that the incidence of unemployment is less for part-time 
workers and the duration of unemployment is less for part-time workers. 
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However, the results are not unambiguous about the relationship between 
part-time workers and the spells of unemployment; part-time workers 
appear to experience as many spells of unemployment as full-time work­
ers. 
Summarizing, this study suggests that part-time work is a viable 
alternative to full-time work, especially for women whose husband is 
present and earns some income and who have young children in the home. 
However, the choice of part-time work does reduce the potential earnings 
of those workers. 
The review of the literature on the labor force participation 
decision indicates that the labor supply and employment decisions of an 
adult female are greatly influenced by the market wage rate, the presence 
of children and other sources of income. Since the presence of children 
and other sources of income tend to negatively affect the decision to 
work in the market, many women voluntarily choose to work part-time 
even though this generally reduces their market wage. 
Minimum wage legislation alters the structure of wages and will 
influence the employment and labor force participation decision of adult 
women. These empirical studies indicate that labor force participation 
is positively related to the market wage. Also the substitution effect 
of a wage change tends to dominate the income effect causing the hours 
allocated to market work to rise when the wage rises. If minimum wage 
legislation reduces the uncovered sector's wage, some women may reduce 
their hours of work. The labor force participation and employment of 
adult women can be expected to be influenced by this legislation. 
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However, the direction of this effect is not clear and the empirical 
tests of this influence are not consistent- This inconsistency indi­
cates a need to re-examine the theoretical and empirical question of 
the impact of minimum wages on adult female employment and labor force 
participation. 
Major Empirical Studies of Minimum Wage Legislation 
Even less research has been done on the impact of minimum wages 
on adult women. The three major studies of this impact have been done 
by Rosters and Welch (20), Gramlich (14), and Mincer (23). The Kosters 
and Welch (20) study is primarily concerned with the impact of minimum 
wages on the distribution of employment among adult men and women and 
teenage workers. The impact of minimum wages on the level of employ­
ment for adult men and women and teenagers is examined in the Gramlich 
(14) study. Mincer's study considers the impact of minimum wage legis­
lation on the employment and labor force participation of adult men, 
adult women and teenagers. 
Kosters and Welch (20) hypothesize that minimum wage legislation 
will alter the distribution of employment between normal and transi­
tional employment. The expectations are that such legislation will 
reduce the marginal workers' share of normal employment and increase 
these workers' share of transitional employment. 
To empirically test this hypothesis, Kosters and Welch (20) 
estimate the coefficients for the employment shares of demographic 
groups based on age, sex and race. The estimated coefficient for the 
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share of normal employment depends upon the minimum wage, the rate of 
economic growth, and previous normal ençloyment levels. The estimated 
coefficient for the share of transitional employment depends upon the 
minimum wage, the rate of economic growth, and the difference between 
actual employment and the level of previous normal employment. 
The coefficient of marginality is the ratio of the estimated 
coefficient of the share of transitional employment to the estimated 
coefficient of the share of normal employment and the elasticity of the 
coefficient of marginality is the difference between the estimated 
mi ni miirn wage elasticity for transitional employment and the estimated 
minimum wage elasticity for normal employment. To support the hypoth­
esis, the value of the coefficient of marginality should be greater 
than one and the elasticity of the coefficient of marginality should 
be greater than zero. 
For all sex and race groups of teenagers, the estimated coeffi­
cients of marginality are greater than one and the estimated elasticity 
of the coefficients of marginality are greater than zero. These results 
indicate that teenagers are marginal workers and their share of normal 
employment is adversely affected and their share of transitional em­
ployment is positively affected by an increase in the minimum wage. 
However, for all adult females, the estimated coefficient of 
marginality is less than one, and the estimated elasticity of the co­
efficient of marginality is negative for white females and positive for 
nonwhite females. These empirical values do not support the hypothesis 
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that women are marginal workers and therefore their normal employment 
may not be adversely affected by minimum wage legislation. 
However, this model does not attempt to test what happens to the 
level of employment with minimum wage legislation; it only tests the 
impact of such legislation on the distribution of employment. The con­
clusion of the study is not that the employment level of adult women is 
positively associated with minimum wage legislation but that the minimum 
wage results in less transitional employment and more permanent employ­
ment for women. 
The Gramlich (14) study shows that minimum wages tend to have a 
positive effect on full time adult female employment rates and a nega­
tive impact on their part time employment. The study also suggests a 
positive relationship between total female employment and the miniimm 
wage. 
Gramlich (14) hypothesizes that minimum wage legislation will 
alter the level and distribution of employment between full time and 
part time employment. The impact of mim'mimi wages on employment de­
pends upon the minimum wage elasticity of the demand for workers and 
the breakeven elasticity (the wage demand elasticity at which the most 
risk averse worker is indifferent to an increase in the minimum wage). 
To adversely affect the employment of low wage workers, the minimum wage 
elasticity of the demand for workers must be greater than the breakeven 
elasticity. 
To empirically test the impact of minimum wages on the eng)loyment 
of adult females, Gramlich (14) uses a quarterly time series regression 
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analysis. The level of aggregate female employment, the level of 
full-time female employment, and the level of part-time female employ­
ment are regressed on the level of nonfarm output or the aggregate 
unemployment rate, the real minimum wage, the number of children age 
1-5 as a proportion of the total population of noninstitutional adult 
females, and a dummy variable for the minimum wage coverage rate. For 
the adult female regressions, the estimated minimum wage coefficients 
for aggregate employment and full-time employment are positive while 
the coefficient from the part-time employment regression is negative. 
None of these coefficients are statistically significant. The estimated 
ïïiim'ïïnnn wage elasticity is less than the estimated breakeven elasticity 
for both the aggregate employment and full time employment models. 
Gramlich (14) concludes that the overall employment of adult 
women is not adversely affected by minimum wage legislation and in 
fact such legislation seems to reallocate women from part-time employ­
ment to full-time employment. 
Mincer's (23) analysis of minimum wages argues that there are 
three effects associated with this legislation; displacement, unemploy­
ment, and withdrawal from the labor force. The implementation of a 
minimum wage in excess of the competitive wage will reduce ençloyment 
in the covered sectors and therefore displace some workers. The unem­
ployment effect results from both the decision of some displaced workers 
to remain in the covered sector to continue to pursue employment in this 
sector and the decision of some workers to enter the covered sector to 
seek employment at the higher minimum wage. Finally the supply of labor 
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will respond to the lower wage rate in the uncovered sector; the lower 
wage may induce some workers to withdraw from the labor force. 
To empirically test the impact of minimum wage legislation on 
employment, unemployment, and labor force participation of adult women. 
Mincer (23) uses a quarterly time series regression analysis for the 
years 1954 to 1969. The model regresses the ratio of employment or 
labor force participation of adult women to the noninstitutional adult 
female population on the minimum wage, the unemployment rate of males 
age 45-54, and a time trend variable. The empirical results of the 
impact of minimum wage legislation on the employment and labor force 
participation of women indicates that the minimum wage reduces both 
the employment and labor force participation of adult women. (Only the 
coefficients for white women are significant.) The results also indi­
cate a positive unemployment effect from such legislation. 
Mincer (23) concludes that minimum wages do adversely influence 
the labor supply and employment decisions of adult females. 
Summarizing this review of the female labor supply and minimum 
wage literature offers several insights. 
Although the market wage rate is the primary determinant of the 
female labor force participation decision, this decision as well as the 
hours of work decision will be influenced by the marital status and 
characteristics of women, the family status of women, and other economic 
factors such as the unemployment rate and the demand for female workers. 
Minimum wage legislation alters the expected market wage rate and 
therefore may alter the labor force participation and employment of 
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adult women. This review of the literature suggests that any analysis 
of the impact of minimum wage legislation on the labor force participa­
tion and ençloyœent of adult women must be combined with the knowledge 
of the determinants of the female labor supply decision-
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CHAPTER III. 
THEORETICAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROBLEM 
The primary purpose of this study is to further examine both the 
theoretical and empirical importance of minimum wage legislation on the 
employment and labor force participation of adult women. The theoret­
ical foundations for this study will be drawn from the Gronau (15) 
analysis of the productive household and its allocation of time, and 
Mincer*s (23) model of minimum wages. 
Theory of Minimum Wages 
Mincer's (23) model suggests that minimum wage legislation has 
three primary effects on the supply of labor and the employment of 
workers. The first of these is the displacement effect. Minimum wage 
legislation dictates a wage rate above the competitive market wage rate 
and results in a loss of employment to some workers in the covered 
sector. Mincer (23) assumes that the probability of employment in the 
covered sector is a random probability. Therefore,which workers lose 
their jobs is unknown and the proportion of workers who lose their jobs 
depends upon the minimum wage and the elasticity of the demand for labor 
in the covered sector. 
Some of the workers displaced by the legislation will choose to 
remain in the covered sector and continue to seek employment in this 
sector. Therefore, the second effect of mininrnm wage legislation is 
unemployment. The size of the unemployment depends upon the workers* 
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expectations of future employment in the covered sector and the ex­
pectations of the paid wage and employment opportunities in the un­
covered sector. 
Theoretically, the level of unemployment in the covered sector 
also depends upon whether the possibility of employment at the minimum 
wage in the covered sector induces workers from the uncovered sector 
to move into the covered sector and seek employment in this sector. 
More specifically. Mincer's (23) model predicts that the unem­
ployment rate in the covered sector depends upon the separation rate 
(6) and the wage gap between the covered sector's minimum wage and the 
uncovered sector's wage. This wage gap depends upon the coverage rate 
(k), the elasticity of the demand for labor in both sectors, the 
separation rate, the elasticity of the supply of labor to the uncovered 
sector and the change in the minimum wage. In general,a separate in­
crease in the minimum wage (Wm) or k or ô will cause unemployment to 
rise. Although Mincer's (23) model assumes that the probability of 
finding a job in the uncovered sector is one, increases in Wm or K will 
increase the displacement effect and therefore the unemployment effect. 
Increases in ô will also increase the unemployment rate by raising 
workers' expectations about employment in the covered sector. Labor 
will move out of the covered sector into the uncovered sector or out of 
the labor force if the elasticity of the demand for labor in the covered 
sector exceeds the separation rate; the displacement effect outweighs 
the turnover of labor in the covered sector. 
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The flow of labor into the uncovered sector will force the wage 
rate down. The labor supply response to this lower wage will be some 
withdrawal from the labor force. Given the displacement and unemploy­
ment effects, the magnitude of the withdrawal depends upon the wage 
elasticity of the supply of labor. The more wage elastic the supply 
of labor, the smaller the re-employment in the uncovered sector and 
the greater the withdrawal effect. 
Referring to Figure 1, the three effects of the legislation may 
be depicted graphically: 
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Figure 1. Covered sector 
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Mincer (23) assumes constant elasticities, so the slope of the demand 
curve, D, is the wage elasticity of the demand for labor, n, and the 
slope of R is the separation rate, o. Imposing a minimum wage, W^, 
reduces employment in the covered sector from to E^; the displace­
ment effect- Given the possibility of future employment in the 
covered sector, because of the separation rate, some workers chose to 
remain in the covered sector. These workers, E L , create the unem-
m m 
ployment effect. The remaining displaced workers, L^E^, either seek 
employment in the uncovered sector or withdraw from the labor force. 
The size of the labor force withdrawal effect is depicted in Figure 2. 
The supply of labor to the uncovered sector shifts by the amount of 
displaced workers who do not remain in the covered sector, L^E^. The 
increase in the supply of labor to the uncovered sector forces the wage 
rate down to W . This leads to an increase in employment of E E and 
n no n 
a labor force withdrawal of E N. 
n 
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Figure 2. Uncovered sector 
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All else equal, the more wage elastic the demand for labor in 
the covered sector, the larger the displacement effect and labor force 
withdrawal effect. However, the more wage elastic the demand for 
labor in the uncovered sector, the smaller the labor force withdrawal 
effect. The greater the separation rate, the larger the unemployment 
effect and the smaller the labor force withdrawal effect. The more 
wage elastic the supply of labor to the uncovered sector, the greater 
the labor force withdrawal. 
Summarizing, Mincer's (23) study suggests that minimum wage 
legislation has three effects. Initially the imposition of a minimum 
wage creates the displacement of workers. Some of these workers choose 
to remain unemployed in the covered sector. Other workers either accept 
employment in the uncovered sector at the lower wage or withdraw from 
the labor force. 
Theory of the Female Labor Supply 
How, then, do minimum wages affect the employment and labor 
supply decisions of adult women? A large segment of the adult female 
labor force is employed in the retail and service industries at rela­
tively low wages. Many of these jobs are covered by minimum wage 
legislation. Theoretically the employment, unemployment, and labor 
supply decisions of these women will be affected by such legislation. 
The important questions are in what direction and of what magnitude 
are these effects? 
To answer these questions, consideration must be given to the 
allocation of time decision. Using Gronau's (15) model of time 
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allocation, the adult woman may allocate her time among three activ­
ities; household production, market work, and leisure. The important 
determinants of this time allocation decision are the potential market 
wage rate, the marginal productivity of household production, and 
sources of other income. 
The potential market wage depends upon the woman's level of edu­
cation and training as well as the current minimum wage and the proba­
bility of getting a minimum wage job. The marginal productivity of 
household production depends upon the woman's level of education, the 
capital to labor ratio used in the production process, and the size of 
family. Other income is derived from the earned income of the other 
family members or the availability of welfare payments. 
More specifically, Gronau's (15) model is one of a productive 
household where the objective is to maximize the utility of the house­
hold given a time and budget constraint. Utility depends upon the 
consumption of three things; market produced goods; X^, household pro­
duced goods. Kg, and leisure, L. Each household has its own production 
function, = f(H), where household produced goods are a function of 
time allocated to such production. The time constraint allows the 
allocation of time among household production; H, market work; W, and 
leisure; L. 
Mathematically the problem is to maximize U(X, L) subject to the 
time constraint T° = N + H + L and income constraint WN + V + PXm 
where W is the earned wage rate, V is other income, and P is the 
average price of the market goods. Maximization requires that 
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The individual will maximize utility be equating the marginal utility 
of time spent at household production to the marginal utility of leisure; 
the ratio of the marginal utility of leisure to the marginal utility of 
market produced goods to the wage price ratio, and the ratio of the 
marginal utility of time spent at household production to the marginal 
utility of market goods to the wage price ratio. 
If hours of market work are zero, the ratio of the marginal utility 
of home produced goods to the marginal utility of leisure must exceed the 
market wage rate; the value of time spent at household production of 
leisure must exceed the value of time spent at market work. 
One of the theoretical implications of the Gronau (15) model is that 
the effects of an increase in the wage rate on the working woman's alloca­
tion of time are unknown. An increase in the wage rate raises the value 
of market time and will reduce the time allocated to household production. 
However, the magnitudes of the substitution and income effects on market 
work and leisure are not known. Therefore the theoretical analysis can­
not determine how an increase in the wage rate will affect the woman's 
allocation of time. 
For a woman who previously did not allocate time to market work, an 
increase in the wage rate will induce her to reallocate her time to in­
clude market work if the new wage rate is greater than her reservation 
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wage rate. If the higher wage rate does not induce the woman to allo­
cate time to market work, the increase in the wage rate will not affect 
her allocation of time. 
A second theoretical implication of the Gronau (15) model is that 
increases in other income will not alter the time allocated to household 
production but will alter the allocation of time between market work and 
leisure of a woman who chooses to allocate time to market work. 
Increases in nonlabor income do not change the marginal produc­
tivity of household production time or the market wage rate. Therefore 
the tradeoff between household production and market work will not be 
affected. The increase in nonlabor income does impose an income effect 
on the demand for leisure and market goods. If leisure is a normal good, 
the income effect should cause a reallocation of time between market work 
and leisure. 
For the woman not participating in the market, an increase in other 
income will cause a reallocation of time between leisure and household 
production. If leisure is a normal good, the expected effect of the 
increase in other income would be a reduction in the time allocated to 
market work for the woman who does participate in the market and a 
reduction in household production for the woman who does not participate 
in the market and therefore an increase in time allocated to leisure. 
Referring to Figure 3, with a budget constraint represented by 
T° V AB, and utility represented by the indifference curve Uo, the 
allocation of time will be T°H hours of household production, EN hours 
of market work, and NO hours of leisure. A higher wage rate will rotate 
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the budget constraint to T® V A' B' and increase the obtainable level of 
utility to U^. One possible response is an increase in hours of market 
work to H* N', an increase in hours of leisure to ON', and a reduction 
in the hours of household production to T®H'. 
The reduction in hours of household production is the only pre­
dictable response to the higher wage rate. The reallocation of time 
between market work and leisure is not predictable on theoretical 
grounds. 
A decline in the market wage rate will have the opposite effect on 
the allocation of time to household production and an unpredictable ef­
fect on the allocation of time between market work and leisure. 
Referring to Figure 3, an increase in other income will shift the 
budget constraint to T° V' A" B" and raise the obtainable level of 
utility. If leisure is a normal good, one possible response is to move 
to indifference curve which results in a reduction in the hours of 
market work to N" H and an increase in hours of leisure to ON" and no 
change in the hours of household production. 
For the woman who does not allocate time to market work, an in­
crease in other income will cause a reallocation of time between leisure 
and household production. Referring to Figure 4, the original budget 
constraint T° V AB will shift to T° V" A" B" and the hours of household 
production will fall from T°H to T°H' and an increase in leisure time 
from OH to OH'. 
Summarizing, the basic theoretical conclusions of the Gronau (15) 
time allocation model are that changes in wage rates will induce women 
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to reallocate their time, but the direction of the reallocation between 
market work and leisure cannot be determined in the theoretical analysis. 
One of the important implications of the Gronau (15) model is that 
women may adjust their hours of market work in response to changes in the 
expected wage rate; part of the time allocation solution may involve a 
choice between full-time and part-time market work. In that Tninimim wage 
legislation will alter the expected wage rate, such legislation may alter 
the distribution of employment between part-time and full-time as well as 
the level of employment. 
Mirn'mnrg Wages and the Female Supply of Labor 
Given this basic theoretical analysis, how will minimum wage legis­
lation alter the allocation of time of an adult woman and what are the 
implications of this reallocation on the employment and labor force 
participation decision? 
By creating a wage differential, minimum wage legislation will alter 
the effective budget constraint faced by an adult woman. Following 
Mincer's (23) analysis some displaced women will seek employment in the 
covered sector and face a potentially higher wage rate. Other women will 
move to the uncovered sector and face a lower wage. This wage differen­
tial should force a reallocation of time but the theoretical analysis does 
not clearly specify the actual impact of minimum wages on this realloca­
tion. Nevertheless, by examining some of the determinants of the impact 
of minimum wages and some of the empirical knowledge about the labor force 
participation decision of adult women, some tentative conclusions may be 
drawn. 
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Mincer's (23) model conditionally predicts that an increase in 
the minimum wage will generate some unemployment and cause some labor 
force withdrawal. This conclusion is conditional on there being some 
labor supply response to the lowered uncovered sector wage, that the 
elasticity of the demand for labor in the covered sector is not equal 
to the separation rate, and that the coverage rate is less than one. 
By modifying these specifications, different results of the im­
pact of such legislation may be obtained. If the supply of labor is 
fixed, the increase in the minimum wage would generate only unemploy­
ment; those workers who do not choose to remain in the covered sector 
will move to the uncovered sector and accept employment at the lower 
uncovered sector's wage. 
This suggests that the more wage elastic the supply of labor, the 
greater will be the labor force withdrawal or the movement to part time 
employment. 
Secondly, with a perfectly inelastic labor supply response and 
with the elasticity of the demand for labor in the covered sector equal 
to the separation rate, an increase in the minimum wage would force all 
displaced workers into the uncovered sector and create no unemployment. 
This suggests that the smaller the difference between the elas­
ticity of the demand for labor in the covered sector and the separation 
rate, the larger the unemployment effect. 
Women tend to have a relatively wage elastic labor supply; women 
have an alternative to market work in the form of household production. 
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Secondly, women tend to have relatively high turnover rates; the 
separation rate for women may be large. 
Referring to Figure 5, a wage elastic supply response, S', will 
encourage more women who are displaced by minimum wage legislation to 
withdraw from the labor force. 
1 
Referring to Figure 6, a large separate rate, ô , will create 
more unemployment ; EmLn' , than a smaller separation rate, Ô, will 
create; EmLm. The larger separation rate will also result in fewer 
women moving to the uncovered sector, Lm'£o as compared to LmEo and a 
smaller decline in the uncovered sector wage. 
Together these two characteristics of the female labor supply 
should create both an unemployment effect and a labor force withdrawal 
effect in response to the minimum wage. 
Also empirical results of the tests of the female labor force 
participation decision indicate that the supply of market work (the 
demand for leisure) is dominated by the substitution effect of a wage 
change. Therefore the time allocation of adult women should be respon­
sive to the wage differential created by minimum wage legislation. The 
substitution effect of the decline in the uncovered sector wage should 
lead to a substantial labor force withdrawal or reduction in the offered 
hours of market work in the uncovered sector. The higher minimum wage 
may also create unemployment in the covered sector as women compete for 
the higher paying jobs. 
Together the application of Mincer's (23) model and the empirical 
evidence of the labor force participation decision suggests that minimum 
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wage legislation should generate a substantial unemployment effect and 
labor force withdrawal effect. However, the labor force withdrawal 
effect may be reduced by the acceptance of part time employment. 
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CHAPTER IV. 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE EMPIRICAL MODEL 
Snimwry of the Minimum Wage Models 
An overview of the minimum wage literature shows there are not con­
sistent empirical results of the impact of such legislation on the adult 
female employment and labor force participation. The Mincer (23) study 
concludes that minimum wage legislation adversely affects the employment 
of adult women and the Gramlich (14) study concludes that this legisla­
tion does not adversely affect and may improve the ençloyment of adult 
women. 
Mincer's (23) study includes a theoretical discussion and empirical 
test of the impact of minimum wage legislation on employment, unemploy­
ment, and labor force participation. Theoretically wage legis­
lation displaces workers in the covered sector and the displaced workers 
face three alternatives. They may choose to remain in the covered sector 
and search for jobs or they may choose to seek employment in the un­
covered sector or they may choose to withdraw from the labor force. 
Mincer (23) hypothesizes that not all displaced workers will choose to 
move to the uncovered sector or out of the labor force and therefore 
Tn-im'TTiiiTn wage legislation will reduce employment and labor force partici­
pation and increase employment. 
To empirically test this hypothesis for the adult female labor 
force. Mincer (23) tests the following equation: LnY = F(M, U, T, t2) 
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The dependent variable is the ratio of the labor force or employment of 
women age 20 and older to the total population of women age 20 and older 
(LF/P or E/P). The independent variables are a minimum wage index^; M, 
the unemployment rate of adult men age 45-54; U, and a linear and quad-
2 
ratic time trend, T and T . 
m-eS Bi) 
where MP is the basic minimum wage for previously covered workers, MN 
is the basic minimum wage for newly covered workers, AHE is the average 
hourly earnings of production workers, P is the fraction of previously 
covered nonsupervisory workers, N is the fraction of newly covered non-
supervisory workers, E is employment, t indexes the total nonform 
economy, and i indexes the major industries within the nonform economy. 
Quarterly time series data for the period 1954 to 1969 are used 
and the minimum wage variable is entered with an Almon distributed lag 
of six or eight quarters. 
The minimum wage coefficients are negative for both white and non-
white women but the coefficients are statistically significant for only 
the white females. The coefficients for white females also indicate 
that the employment effect is stronger than the labor force participa­
tion effect; white female unemployment will be positively affected by 
minimum wage legislation. Mincer (23) concludes that the adult female 
^he minimum wage index is the one constructed by the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (35). 
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labor force and employment are significantly affected by this legisla­
tion. 
The Gramlich (14) study hypothesizes that minimum wage legislation 
alters the level and distribution of employment. The major concern of 
this study is to consider the income redistribution effects of minimum 
wage legislation and to do so Gramlich (14) must consider the impact on 
employment. Because his study is considering how the welfare of low wage 
workers is affected by minimum wage legislation, he hypothesizes that the 
importance of the impact of this legislation is how it alters the dis­
tribution of employment between full-time and part-time employment. Part-
time employment is viewed as less desirable than full-time employment be­
cause it results in lower wages and fewer hours. 
To empirically test the impact of this legislation on adult women, 
Gramlich (14) uses a set of regression models based on a CES production 
function of the demand for labor: 
InE = g [L(lnR), L(lnQ), T, InK, c] 
InE = g [L(lnR), L(lnU), T, InK, C] 
InE = g [L(lnR), L(LnE^), T, InK, c] 
where E is the civilian nonagricultural employment of adult women (aggre­
gate employment, full time employment and part time employment), Q is 
civilian nonagricultural output, R is the minimum in real dollars, t is a 
time trend variable, U is the aggregate unemployment rate adjusted by the 
demographic composition, K is the number of children age one to five as a 
proportion of the total population of noninstitutionalized adult females, 
E*^ is the enqjloyment of all teenagers and adults, and C is a dummy vari­
able for changes in the coverage rate. 
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Each model is estimated using total employment, full-time employ­
ment, and part-time employment as the dependent variable and the first 
model is estimated twice, the second estimation constrains the Q coef­
ficient to equal 1. Each model is estimated with an autoregressive 
procedure where the minimum wage is entered with an Almon lag of four 
or six quarters. Quarterly time series data are used; the total em­
ployment model covers the period 1948 to 1975 and due to data limita­
tions the full-time and part-time models cover the period 1963 to 1975. 
For adult females, three of the four minimum wage coefficients 
in the total employment and full-time employment models were positive. 
For the total employment model, the negative coefficient is found in 
the model that constrains the Q coefficient to equal 1 and for the full-
time employment model, the negative coefficient is found in the model 
that includes the unemployment variable. All minimum wage coefficients 
in the part-time employment models are negative. 
Gramlich (14) concludes that minimum wage legislation does not 
force adult women out of the higher wage jobs and into the low wage 
part-time jobs and hypothesizes that the reverse may be true. Therefore, 
minimum wage legislation does not adversely affect the employment of 
adult women. 
Analysis of the Conceptual and Empirical Differences 
of the Minimum Wage Models 
The summary of the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) studies suggests 
that the differences in the approach and estimation procedures may 
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account for the conflicting results. Since Gramlich's (14) major con­
sideration is the impact of minimum wage legislation on the welfare of 
low wage workers, the model is concerned with estimating the impact of 
minimum wages on the distribution of employment between full time and 
part time- Mincer's (23) objective is to analyze how minimum wage 
legislation affects not only the demand side of the market but also the 
supply side. Therefor^ Mincer (23) is concerned with estimating the 
impact of minimum wages on both employment and labor force participa­
tion. The differences in the emphasis of the studies lead to the 
construction of somewhat different empirical models. These differences 
may provide a partial explanation of the conflicting results of these 
two studies-
One possibly important difference is the specification of the 
dependent variable. Both studies estimate the contribution of the 
minimum wage to employment. Mincer (23) measures employment as a func­
tion of the population and Gramlich (14) measures the absolute level of 
employment. Therefore Gramlich's (14) measurement of employment may 
reflect a long run trend of a larger absolute number of employed workers 
but it does not reflect accurately the percentage of a demographic 
group, such as adult women, that is employed; this measurement does not 
control for any trends in the size of the population. Given the upward 
trend in the labor force participation and employment of adult women, 
not controlling for the population size may disguise the true impact of 
this legislation on their employment. Although Mincer (23) does not 
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estimate models for full-time and part-time employment, the same 
specification problem may occur in the Gramlich (14) models. Use of 
the absolute levels of full-time and part-time employment fails to 
control for any trends in total employment and a more accurate measure­
ment may be the fraction of total employment that is full-time and part-
time. 
Another possibly important difference is one specification of the 
independent variables. Mincer (23) uses the standard B.L.S. measure of 
the coverage-adjusted ratio of the minimum to average wage, and Gramlich 
(14) uses the real minimum wage and a separate dummy variable for the 
years when there is a change in the coverage rate. The real difference 
between the Mincer (23) specification and the Gramlich (14) specifica­
tion is the inclusion of the coverage rate. 
The inclusion of a separate variable for the coverage rate sep­
arates the effects of changes in the minimum wage and changes in the 
coverage rate. Mincer's (23) theoretical analysis suggests either 
an increase in the wage rate or the coverage rate will reduce total 
employment. However, a change in the wage by itself will generate a 
smaller employment effect than the same change in the wage that is 
accompanied by an increase in the coverage rate. Gramlich (14) argues 
that changes in the coverage rate have a separate and distinct effect 
on the level of employment. Increases in the coverage rate will reduce 
employment in sectors that were originally part of the uncovered sec­
tors, as well as in sectors which continue to be covered. 
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There is no absolute argument in favor of either specification. 
In the context of legislated automatic increases in the minimum wage, 
the wage rate may change more frequently than the coverage rate. 
Therefore,the wage rate may have a separate and important effect on 
employment. However, Gramlich's (14) specification of the coverage 
variable as a dummy variable limits the measured impact- C = 1 only 
for the years when there is a change in the coverage rate and it is 
not clear that the effect is so limited. The B.L.S. measurement of 
the minimum wage variable is constructed by combining the minimum wage 
and coverage rate in the "old" covered sector and the minimum wage and 
coverage rate in the newly covered sector. Therefore, the B.L.S. 
measurement does incorporate the separate effect of the newly covered 
sector but it does not place any time constraint on this effect. There­
fore, these different specifications of the coverage variable may par­
tially explain the different results of the two studies. 
These studies also control differently for long run trends in 
the labor supply decision of adult women. Mincer (23) uses a linear 
2 
and a quadratic time trend variable; T and T , and Gramlich (14) uses 
a variable for childcare responsibilities, K as well as a linear time 
trend. 
Labor force participation studies of adult females indicate that 
household responsibilities and other sources of income influence the 
female labor supply decision and therefor^ their employment. Neither 
model adequately controls for these nonmarket factors. A general time 
trend variable may pick up the effects of more than one factor. This 
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may reduce its effectiveness as a significant explanatory variable. 
Although the childcare variable is an important determinant of the 
adult female labor force participation and employment, it is only one 
of the nonmarket factors that influence these decisions. 
Admittedly any empirical model testing the impact of minimum 
wage legislation on the employment of adult females will have problems 
specifying variables that represent these nonmarket factors. The ex­
clusion of these variables may bias the estimated coefficients of the 
included variables and may provide a partial explanation of the dif­
ferent results of the two studies. 
Finally, the two studies use a different variable specification 
for the measurement of economic activity. Mincer (23) uses the unemr-
ployment rate of adult men age 45 to 54 and Gramlich (14) uses the 
aggregate employment or unemployment rate or the aggregate level of 
nonform output. 
Changes in the level of output and changes in unemployment or 
employment reflect the cyclical nature of the economy. Mincer's (23) 
variable, by measuring the unemployment of men established in the labor 
market and their occupations, captures the existence of cyclical un­
employment. Because of evidence that secondary workers move in and 
out of the labor force over the business cycle, the aggregate employ­
ment or unemployment variable of the Gramlich (14) model does not re­
flect as accurately the cyclical nature of the economy. Therefore, if 
the rate of unemployment is to be used as a variable. Mincer's (23) 
specification is preferred. 
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Construction of the Models 
In order to establish the impact of minimum wages on the adult 
female labor force participation and employment, not only must the 
Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) models be re-estimated, a more extensive 
model must be constructed. The labor force participation studies and 
time allocation models suggest that the adult female labor force par­
ticipation and therefore employment are governed by the presence of 
household responsibilities, alternate sources of income, job avail­
ability and the value of market work. 
The positive relationship between the value of market work and 
the labor force participation of adult women is well-documented. How­
ever, the employment and labor force participation of women also de­
pends upon the availability of employment. Mincer (23) suggests this 
in the analysis of the separation rate and includes a measurement of 
the unemployment rate as an index of this overall demand for labor. 
Bowen and Finegan (6) suggest the time allocation decision also de­
pends upon the occupational distribution of employment. Women tend to 
be concentrated into a small number of occupations and the percentage 
of total employment in these occupations measures a large part of the 
demand for female labor. 
The labor force participation and employment of adult women also 
depends upon nonmarket factors. As Gronau (15) points out, women have 
an alternative to market work in the form of household production. 
Children represent a major source of household responsibilities and the 
labor force participation studies of women indicate that the presence 
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of children does affect their market work decision. However, women 
with children do choose market work as part of their allocation of 
time. For these women there is not only a positive return (the wage 
rate) but also a cost (foregone household production or the cost of 
domestic service) associated with market work. So both the return and 
the costs must be considered in the time allocation decision. 
The marital status of women also influences the labor force par­
ticipation and employment decision. The presence of a husband implies 
household responsibilities and an alternate source of income. The 
absence of a husband implies the alternate source of income may be 
welfare income. 
This suggests constructing models similar to those used by 
Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) and a more extensive model than includes 
variables representing the return and cost of market work, other 
sources of income, and the occupational employment mix. 
For the replications of the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) models, 
the two basic equations to be estimated are: 
(1) InY = f (M, U, T, T^) 
(2) InX = f (InR, InU, InK, C, T) 
where Y is the ratio of either the labor force or employment of women 
age 20 and older to the population of women age 20 and older, M is the 
B.L.S. minimum wage, U is the unemployment rate of men age 35 to 54, 
2 T and T are time trends, X is either the labor force, aggregate em­
ployment, full time or part time employment of women age 20 and older, 
R is the real minimum wage, C is the coverage rate, and K is children 
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in the home. The replications of these studies cover the same time 
periods as Mincer (23), 1954-1969, and Gramlich (14), 1949-1975, for 
aggregate employment and 1963-1975 for full-time and part-time employ­
ment, and are based on quarterly data. 
For the extended model, an annual time series regression analysis 
is used and covers the period from 1950 to 1977. The estimated equa­
tion is 
(3) InY = f (M, RWA, E, R, K, Hy, ADC, P^, 0). 
The independent variables are the current and quarterly one year lagged 
B.L.S. minimum wage measurement; M and M}, median educational attainment; E, 
the real full time female earnings; RWA, the unemployment rate of men 
age thirty-five to fifty-four; U, the presence of children; K, the 
median husband's income; Hy, median welfare income; ADC, the price of 
domestic service; P^, and the occupational mix; 0. The dependent 
variables, InY, are the employment and labor force to population 
ratios. The dependent variable is stratified by marital status to 
capture any differential impact. Data on the labor force participation 
and employment of women by marital status are only available as annual 
data in the March Special Labor Force Reports (38) and thus limits the 
model to one observation per year. 
Reconciliation of the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) studies re­
quires the use of two different measures of the minimum wage; the real 
TTn'm'TTiinn wage and the B.L.S. minimum wage index. The real minimimi wage 
is constructed by dividing the nominal minimum wage by the consumer 
price index. The minimum wage index, as mentioned previously, is based 
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upon the index published by the B.L.S. and interpolated to quarterly 
observations, taking into account the timing of wage increases. The 
real minimum wage variable is used in the re-estimation of the Gramlich 
(14) model. The minimum wage index is used in the re-estimation of the 
Mincer (23) model. 
Both studies control for the cyclical nature of the economy by 
including a measurement of unemployment. This re-estimation procedure 
will include a variable, U, which is the quarterly unemployment rate of 
men age 35 to 54 and is constructed from the unemployment data published 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (36). 
The reconciliation of Mincer's (23) and Gramlich's (14) models 
also requires estimating the contribution of the presence of children 
to the labor force participation and employment decision. To control 
for this, the variable K is constructed as the ratio of ever married 
women with children under the age of six to all women. To construct 
this ratio the ratio of ever married women with children under the age 
of six to all ever married women is multiplied by the ratio of all ever 
married women to all women. Since it is primarily the presence of young 
children in the home that influences the woman's allocation of time, 
this variable should provide an adequate measurement of the responsi­
bilities of child care. Although this measurement does not show a sub­
stantial increase during the "baby boom" years, it does show a steady 
decline during the late 1960s and the 1970s. The data for this variable 
are available in the annual March Special Labor Force Report (38), 
47 
Marital and Family Characteristics, 1959-1978 (32), and the CPR Series 
P-50 Labor Force Reports, 1948-195G (38). Quarterly data were obtained 
by interpolation. 
The re-estimation of the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) models 
also requires the inclusion of a set of dummy variables and time trend 
variables. The re-estimation model of the Mincer (23) model includes a 
dummy variable for the change in the B.L.S. estimation procedure of the 
employment and labor force participation data; D=1 after 1962, second 
quarter, and a set of seasonal dunnny variables. The replication of the 
model also includes a linear and quadratic time trend variable. The 
replication of the Gramlich model includes three dummy variables, one 
for each change in the coverage rate. The coverage variable equals one 
if the rate changed in that year- The replication of the Gramlich (14) 
model also includes a linear time trend variable and three seasonal 
dummy variables. 
The dependent variable, the ratio of the labor force participation 
or employment of adult women to the adult female population, is avail­
able from the B.L.S. quarterly labor force participation and employment 
data. The full-time and part-time employment data are also available 
from the B.L.S. 
The extended model's independent variables are the minimum wage, 
the unemployment rate, the full-time female earnings, educational at­
tainment, the presence of children, the husband's income, the aid-to-
dependent children payment, the cost of domestic service, and the 
occupational mix. The dependent variables are the ratio of labor force 
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to population and the employment to population of all women age 14 
years or older by marital status and the labor force participation to 
population of women age 20 to 24, age 25 to 34, and age 35 to 44 by 
marital status. 
The dependent variable data are available in the CPR series P-50 
Labor Force Reports and Special Labor Force Reports; Marital and Family 
Characteristics. 
The minimum wage variable in this extended model is the standard 
B.L.S. variable that is used in the re-estimation of the Mincer(23) 
model. 
The unemployment variable used in the extended model is the un­
employment rate of men age 35-54 for the first quarter of the year. 
This measurement was chosen because of the survey period for the de­
pendent variables. 
Since the studies of the female labor force participation deci­
sion suggest that the value of nonmarket time significantly influences 
this decision, the extended model includes two measurements of this 
alternative to market work. One alternative to the women's own house­
hold production is to hire domestic service. The cost of this domestic 
service provides an estimation of the value of household production. 
The variable is the annual consumer price index measurement of the 
cost of domestic service in constant dollars and is available in the 
Consumer Price Index (37). 
The other nonmarket time variable is the presence of children. 
The extended model variable, K, is the ratio of all ever married women 
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with children ever bom to all women age 14 to 54. It is constructed 
from the ratio of all ever married women with children ever bom to all 
ever married women and the ratio of all ever married women to all women. 
These data are available in the CPR Series P-20 Population Character­
istics (33).^ 
The influence of the alternative sources of income on the employ­
ment and labor force participation decision is controlled for with the 
variables for the husband's income and the availability of welfare. The 
husband's income variable, Hy, measures the median annual income of a 
male head of household whose wife is present and the welfare variable, 
ADC, measures the average annual aid-to-dependent children payment per 
recipient. The data for the husband's income variable are available in 
the Series P-60; Consumer Income, of the Current Population Reports (33). 
The average annual AFDC payment per recipient is available in the Social 
Security Bulletin. Both income measurements are adjusted by the consumer 
price index and therefore in constant dollar terms. 
The empirical model will control for the demand for female labor 
with a measurement of the occupational mix. The variable 0 is the ratio 
of employment in the sales, service and clerical occupations to total 
employment. Since women tend to be crowded into these occupations, this 
ratio should provide a reasonable estimation of the demand for female 
labor. The ratio is constructed from 4th quarter data available in the 
^Although this is a different measurement of the children variable 
than the one used in the replication cf the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) 
studies, initial regression results do not indicate that the estimation 
of the coefficient is highly sensitive to the new specification. 
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Monthly Report on the Labor Force (35). Since this series moves smoothly it 
should not be too sensitive to this limitation. 
The most difficult variable to construct is the variable that 
measures value of the woman's market time. The minimum wage variable 
measures only the return to market work in the covered sector. There 
are no time series data available on the average hourly wage paid to 
females for the period of 1949 to 1977. The closest approximation of 
the earnings opportunities for women is the median annual wage and salary 
income of women that is available in the Current Population Reports Series 
P-60; Consumer Income (31 J. 
A variable measuring the relative return to market work for women 
may be constructed by using the ratio of the median annual wage and 
salary income of women to the median annual wage and salary income of 
men. However, an analysis of this variable reveals some problems in 
interpreting its contribution to the employment and labor force partici­
pation decision. The female-male wage gap widens during the 1950s and 
1960s and then narrows during the 1970s. Since the hours of work and the 
investment in human capital will affect both female and male wages, 
changes in either determinant will affect the relative measurement and 
possibly bias the estimated contribution of the return to market work. 
The presence of discrimination also affects the size of the female-male 
wage gap. Finally there is a selectivity bias associated with the 
measurement of the female wage and this bias may affect the size of the 
wage gap. The value of a woman's nonmarket time tends to exceed that of 
a man's. Therefore, a larger portion of the wage offer distribution for 
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women is unacceptable and this portion is not observed. As Gronau (16) 
points out, this bias results in an overestimation of the value of 
market time for women and underestimates the size of the male-female 
wage gap. 
The most important consideration to this discussion is the rela­
tionship between the hours of work pattern and the wage differential. 
Since women tend to work fewer hours than men, their median annual in­
come will be less than men's, even if the average hourly wage gap is 
small. This consideration reduces the income ratio's effectiveness as a 
measurement of the value of the female's market time. This measurement 
problem is particularly important to the question of the distribution of 
employment between full-time and part-time employment. The median annual 
wage and salary income of women depends upon the hourly wage rate and the 
hours of work. Therefore, this wage measurement may not be completely 
independent of the hours of work decision. Does the annual wage and 
salary income ratio change because of a change in the hours of work or 
because of a change in the wage rate? Since this income ratio does not 
control for the hours of work pattern of women, the measurement may bias 
the estimated contribution of this variable to the employment and labor 
force participation decision-
Another possible measurement of the return to market work is the 
real median annual wage and salary income of women who work full time. 
This variable is constructed from the CPR Series P-60 (31) and the Consumer 
Price Index (37). By holding hours of work constant, this measurement elim­
inates the bias associated with variations in weeks and hours worked per 
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year. If part-time wages move in proportion to full-time wages over 
time, then this measurement may better capture the hourly wage rate for 
an adult female. This measurement of the return to market work is used 
in a study by Cain (7) and has the appropriate sign for married women 
whose husbands are present and for women other than ever married. 
The full-time wage and salary income measurement is available only 
from 1955 and as a result it was necessary to exterpolate back to 1950 
by estimating the equation 
RWA = + 0^ WTH + 62 WPH 
where RWA is the real median annual full-time female income, WTW is the 
real median annual female wage and salary income multiplied by the ratio 
of total employment to full-time employment of females and WPH is the 
average part-time hours worked multiplied by the ratio of part-time 
female employment to full-time female employment. 
The equation was derived from an equation measuring median wage 
and salary income; 
TRW = 
N 
where Mp^ is the part-time wage rate, Wp^ is hours worked part-time, 
is the full-time wage rate, is hours worked full-time and N is 
the total number of workers. To simplify the equation, Mp^ and 
were assumed to be constant across workers. The data for these variables 
are available in the CPR series P-60 Consumer Income (31), CPR Series P-50 
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Work Experience of the Population (34) and the Special Labor Force Reports 
Work Experience (39). 
Another possible measurement of the return to market work is the 
educational attainment of women. Education increases the expected wage 
rate and to the extent that changes in job training are correlated with 
changes in formal education, educational attainment may control for the 
return to market work. 
The Bowen and Finegan (6) study indicates a positive relationship 
between the labor force participation rate and educational attainment, 
and the Gronau (15) study indicates a positive relationship between the 
hours of work and educational attainment. Ferber and Lowry's (11) study 
of sex differentials in earnings shows a positive relationship between 
female earnings and educational attainment but that the return is less 
for women than for men. An analysis of the median annual income of women 
by educational attainment also suggests there is a positive monetary 
return to education. However, these relationships were found in cross-
section studies rather than time series. 
An analysis of the median education attainment of women over time 
shows an increase in the median since the 1950s. The time path for the 
educational attainment is different than the time paths for the two 
alternate sources of income and therefore the inclusion of this variable 
should provide additional information about the determinants of the em­
ployment and labor force participation decision of adult women. 
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The educational variable, E, included in the extended model, 
the median educational attainment of women in the labor force and 
available annually in the Handbook of Labor statistics (37). 
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CHAPTER V. 
RECONCILIATION OF MINIMUM WAGE MODELS 
My attempts in this section to re-cjtinate Mincer (23) and Gramlich 
(14) minimum wage models leads to some reconciliation of the impact of 
minimum wages on the employment and labor force participation of adult 
women. With a few exceptions, the results also indicate that the em­
ployment and labor force participation decisions are inversely related 
to unemployment. Most of the regression coefficients for unemployment 
are negative. Although some of the regression coefficients are negative, 
the time series variation of the children does not appear to ad­
versely affect the aggregate labor force participation and employment of 
adult women. The results suggest that the presence of children primarily 
affects the hours of work decision; the presence of children is posi­
tively related to part time employment. 
Since the major concern of the empirical analysis is to determine 
the impact of minimum wage legislation, the emphasis of the discussion 
of the empirical results will be on this variable. Major exceptions to 
the above mentioned conclusions will be noted. 
Re-estimation of Mincer (23) Model 
The first empirical model re-estimated is the Mincer (23) model. 
The dependent variable is the proportion of noninstitutionalized civilian 
white or nonwhite females age 20 and older who are members of the labor 
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force or who are employed. The independent variables are the Almon lag 
miniminn wage variable^, the current and previous quarterly unençloyment 
rate for men age 35-54, three seasonal dummy variables, a dummy variable 
for definitional changes (1962-), and a linear and quadratic time trend 
variable. The model is estimated for the period 1954 to 1969. 
The estimated elasticities for white females are shown in Table la, 
columns 3 and 4 and the estimated elasticities for nonwhite females are 
shown in Table 2a, columns 3 and 4. All elasticities are computed using 
the regression coefficients and mean values of the variables. (The 
individual eight quarter minimum wage coefficients are in Table lb and 
2b, columns 3 and 4.) All minimum wage elasticities (ZBm) are positive 
and those for the nonwhite females are significant. 
These mim'-miTm wage results do not agree with those of the Mincer 
(23) study. In that study the minimum wage elasticities are negative 
and significant for white females and negative but insignificant for 
nonwhite females. 
Although this study does re-estimate the Mincer (23) study, 
it does not exactly replicate it; the specification of the unemployment 
and Almon lag minimum wage variable differ. Mincer's (23) study uses 
the unemployment rate of men age 45 to 54 as opposed to men age 35 to 54. 
However, this difference would not seem to be a major problem and the 
regression results do have consistently negative signs, although they 
differ in magnitude. 
^The Almon lag variable is created by using an 8 quarter lag 
period and a third degree LaGrangian polynomial. The weights are not 
constrained to equal 1 in either the first or the last period. The 
minimum wage data is the standard B.L.S. measurement. 
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TABLE la 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF WHITE 
WOMEN AGE 204-, 1954-1969* 
Mincer (23) Almoti Long Almon lag Unconstrained lag 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
ZB. -.023 -.035 
(7.20)^ (9-12)^ 
.025 .028 .063 , .060 
(1.78) (1.01) (1.48)* (1.53)* 
ZEu .258 -.636 
(4.34)^ 
-.001 -.003 (-.029)J-0.66) 
(2.57) (-7.07) *(-1.31) 
B, —. 80 -1.22 .086 .074 .112 .122 
z (-1.09) (-1.74) (.002) (.002) (6.38)* (7.41)* 
B.2 .002 .002 .028 .028 0 0 
z (6.32) (7.19) (.002) (.002) (-.10) (-.62) 
R2 
.98 .99 .945 .932 .959 .969 
d 1.64 1.79 .803^ .496= 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-statistic. 
'^Note the size of the Durbin-Watson statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE lb 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR ALMON LAG AND UNCONSTRAINED 
LAC MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WHITE FEMALES AGE 20+ 
1954-1969 
Mincer (23) Lone Almon lag Unconstrained 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
"ml -.007 -.015 .0008 .0009 .001 -.0002 
\2 -.005 — .008 .0001 .0002 -.0004 .0005 
-.003 -.003 -.0001 -.0001 -.0005 -.0005 
-.018 0 -.0001 -.0001 .0025 .0025 
\5  -.002 0 .0002 .0001 -.0015 -.0015 
\6  -.003 -.002 .0003 .0003 .0004 .0009 
\7  -.004 — .006 .0004 .0003 .0014 .0014 
00 
- .006 -.013 -.0008 -.0007 -.0009 -.0012 
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TABLE 2a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF NON-
WHITE WOMEN AGE 20+, 1954-1969 
Mincer (23) Almon Lone Almon lag Unconstrained lag 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
-.004 
(1.68)" 
.002 
(1.90)" 
.063 
(2.82) 
.095 
* (3.21)* 
.063 , .063 , 
(.859) (1.69)" 
ZB 
u 
-.026^ 
(.19)t 
-1.84 * 
(4.8l)b 
— .006 
(-5.07) 
— .008 
* (2.59)* 
-.008 , -.007 , . 
(.431)" (24.84)" 
3.17 
(1.96) 
2.18 
(1.26) 
.09 
(.002) 
.058 
(.001) 
.09 .083 
(4.88)* (4.29)* 
R2 
0 
(-.22) 
1.87 
.84 
0 
(.34) 
1.58 
.89 
0 
(0) 
.846 
0 
(0) 
.781 
-.028 -.028 
(-1.74) (-1.44) 
.866 .902 
d 1.87 1.58 1.91 1.51 
N 64 64 64 64 64 64 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-statistics. 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
59 
TABLE 2 b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR ALMON LAG AND UNCONSTRAINED 
LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF NONWHITE FEMALES AGE 20+ 
1954-1969 
Mincer (23) Long Almon lag Unconstrained 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
-.027 -.052 -.0002 -.0016 .00003 -.0015 
.^2 
-.013 -.020 .0003 .0007 -.0003 .0005 
-.002 .003 .0007 .0014 -.0007 -.0023 
.006 .0018 .0005 .001 -.0001 .0028 
\5  .010 .024 .00001 .002 .0019 .002 
.010 .023 -.0004 -.0007 .0002 -.0002 
3.7 .007 .013 -.0007 -.0009 -.0034 -.0023 
\s  .001 -.005 .0018 .0026 .004 .0033 
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To create the Almon lag variable, this study used a third degree 
polynomial function while the Mincer (23) study used a second degree 
polynomial function. The specification of the degree of the polynomial 
will determine the values of the Almon variables and the weights of the 
Almon variables. Therefore the degree of the polynomial will determine 
the minimum wage coefficients and the inconsistency of these two sets 
of results may lie in the specification of the degree of the polynomial 
function. 
To verify the results of this study, the same regression equation 
was re-estimated by entering the minimum wage variable as an unconstrain­
ed 8 quarter lag variable. The results of this exercise are in Table la, 
columns 5 and 6 and Table 2b, columns 5 and 6. (The individual 8 quarter 
coefficients are in Table lb and 2b, columns 5 and 6.) The minimum wage 
elasticities are positive although none are significant. Although all 
the unemployment elasticities are negative, the size of the elasticities 
appear, in some cases, to be sensitive to the Almon lag procedure. 
The results of the unconstrained lag and the re-estimated Almon lag 
regressions are similar. This suggests the differences in these results 
and Mincer's (23) may not be totally attributed to the Almon lag pro­
cedure. The re-estimation procedure attempted to duplicate as closely 
as possible the data set and regression procedure used by Mincer (23). 
Mincer (23) reports only the means of his data set so the data set used 
in this study is constructed from what specifications are stated in his 
article. 
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These data were checked for questionable observations by plotting 
the observations and by comparing the means with those of the Mincer (23) 
study. The means are reported in the summary table in the Appendix. 
The means of the dependent variables are virtually the same. (None 
differs by more than .001.) Given the differences in the age categories 
for the unemployment variable, the means for this variable are slightly 
different. (Mincer's unemployment mean is .0323 while the mean for this 
study is .0315.) As stated earlier, the differences in this specifica­
tion should not significantly affect the results. Therefore, differences 
in the minimum wage variables may possibly create some of the discrep­
ancies in the empirical results. The means are slightly different; 
Mincer's (23) mean is 32.1, while the mean of this study is 31.5. This 
slight difference may be due to the interpolation procedure. However, 
Mincer (23) uses the teenage minimum wage series for the adult female 
regressions while this study uses the all groups series. Mincer (23) 
justifies the use of this series on the basis of the similarity of the 
distribution of employment. Both series do exhibit the same trends and 
therefore this difference should not significantly affect the empirical 
results. 
The examination of this data set does not suggest any serious 
deficiencies in the data. Other than the difference in the Almon lag 
procedure, the cause for this discrepancy in the results is not clear. 
Since the results of the unconstrained minimum wage model are 
consistent with those of the re-estimation of the Mincer (23) study. 
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the results suggest that minimum wage legislation does not adversely 
affect the labor force participation and employment of adult women. 
Re-estimation of Gramlich (24) Model 
I also re-estimated the Gramlich (14) model. The dependent vari-
2 
able is the aggregate employment (or part-time or full-time employment) 
of noninstitutionalized civilian women age 20 and older. Although the 
Gramlich study only used employment as a dependent variable, this study 
re-estimated his model using both employment and the labor force of non-
institutionalized civilian women age 20 and older as dependent variables. 
3 
The independent variables are the Aloon lag minimum wage , the quarterly 
unemployment rate of men age 35 to 54, the proportion of women age 20 
and older with children under the age of six, three dummy coverage rate 
variables (one for each change in the coverage rate, C = 1 if the cover­
age rate changed in that year), three seasonal dummy variables and a 
linear time trend variable. The aggregate unemployment model is esti­
mated for the period 1949 to 1975 and the full-time and part-time models 
are estimated for the period 1963 to 1975. The aggregate unemployment 
model is also estimated for the period 1963-1975. 
The results ara shown in Table 3a, columns 2 and 3, and Table 4a, 
columns 3,4, and 5. (Individual 4 quarter minimum wage coefficients 
2 The full-time employment measurement includes women who usually 
work full-time but are involuntarily working part-time where full-time 
is defined as 35 hours or more a week. 
3 The Almon lag v triable is created by using a 4 quarter lag period 
and a third degree LaGrangian polynomial. The minimum wage variable is 
the real Tn-îm'miim wage. Gramlich (14) uses a 4 quarter lag period but 
does not specify the degree of the polynomial. 
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TABLE 3a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS (ELASTICITIES) - LABOR FORCE 
PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 20 
AND OLDER 1948-1975® 
Gramlich (14) Long Alinon lag 
E LF E 
B 
n 
.028 
(1.3) 
-.047 
(.249) 
-.097 
(.377) 
B 
u 
-.03 
(-4.8)* 
.034 
(-4.60)* 
-.0537 
(5.99)* 
\ — .08 (-2.0)* -.274 (-2.01)* -.038 (-2.45) 
:t .007 (26.3)* 
.0024 
(10.6)* 
.003 
(10.18)* 
^1 b .0122 (.949) 
.0215 
(1.36) 
:c2 b .0068 (-.507) 
-.0038 
(-.226) 
:c3 b .0007 (.05) 
.0078 
(.478) 
R2 .999 .999 .999 
d .34 1.81 2.02 
N 108 108 108 
^t-statistics are in parentheses; degrees of freedom (13,104). 
^These results are not reported. 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 3 b-
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1949-1975 
LF 
-.220 -.176 
B^ .233 .138 
B^ .091 .049 
B_, -.151 -.108 
R4 
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TABLE 4 a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS (ELASTICITIES) - FULL TIME, 
PART TIME AND AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN 
AGE 20 AND OLDER, 1963-1975^ 
Grimlich (14) Long Almon lag 
FT PT FT PT E 
-R 
-.004 
(.1) 
—. 100 
(.8) 
.376 
(.289) 
-.031 
(.059) 
-.159 
(.341) 
B 
u 
-.031 
(-6.8)* 
-.034 
(2.1)* 
.054 
(1.30) 
-.079 
(—4.38)* 
-.070 
(-4.63)* 
-.22 
(1.6) 
-1.26 
(2.8)* 
-1.42 
(-1.09) 
-1.03 
(-1.79) 
-.995 
(-2.07)* 
»t .006 
(4.6) 
-.001 
(.3) 
.0009 
(.376) 
.0023 
(2.16)* 
.0011 
(1.27) 
®c2 b b .015 
(.261) 
.0097 
(.377) 
.0252 
(1.18) 
:c3 b b -0.16 
(.338) 
-.0133 
(.613) 
.0117 
C.653) 
R2 
.997 .985 .999 .999 .999 
d 1.26 1.20 2.34 2.15 2.16 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
^t-statistics are in parentheses; degrees of freedom (12.52). 
^These results are not reported. 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 4b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR FULL-TIME, PART-TIME AND AGGREGATE EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 2(H-, 1963-1975 
FT PT E 
=R1 1.498 -.580 .16 
-1.57 .032 -.412 
®R3 -.598 .278 -.144 
BR4 1.05 .240 .236 
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for this study are shown in Tables 3b and 4b.) For aggregate employ­
ment the minimum wage elasticities are negative but none are sig­
nificant. The minimum wage elasticity for part-time employment is also 
negative, but for full-time employment the elasticity is positive. 
Neither elasticity is significant. The coverage variables (B^) are 
mixed in sign but none are significant. These initial replications of 
the Gramlich (14) study also result in negative but not significant 
elasticities for the children variables. 
With the exception of the sign of the minimum wage elasticity for 
aggregate employment, these results are similar to those of the Gramlich 
(14) study. Gramlich (14) does not report any summary of his data so 
the data set and regression procedure for this study are constructed as 
closely as possible to specifications reported in his study. The dif­
ference in the full-time employment measurement has already been noted. 
Also, Gramlich (14) does not report the coverage coefficients and it is 
not clear from his article which coverage variables are left in his 
final equations. The results of this replication suggest the separate 
coverage variables do not significantly contribute to the understanding 
of the impact of minimum wage legislation. This may be attributed to 
the limited specification of the variable. 
Further Testing of the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) Models 
The re-estimations of the Gramlich (14) and the Mincer (23) models 
do not support the hypothesis that minimum wage legislation adversely 
affects the labor force participation and employment of adult women. 
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However, the Gramlich (14) model presents some problems in inter­
pretation. The employment dependent variable does not control for 
changes in the population and the full-time and part-time dependent 
variables do not control for changes in the aggregate level of employ­
ment. Therefore the Gramlich (14) model is re-estimated again by sub­
stituting the ratio of aggregate employment of women.20 and older to 
the population of women age 20 and older for the level of employment as 
the dependent variable in the aggregate employment equation. The ratio 
of either full-time or part-time employment of women age 20 and older to 
the aggregate employment of women age 20 and older is substituted for 
the level of full-time or part-time employment as the dependent variable 
in these equations. The estimated elasticities are shown in Table 5a, 
column 3 and Tables 6a and 7a, column 2. (The individual coefficients for 
the 4 quarter minimum wage variables are in Table 5b, column 1 and Table 
6b, columns 1 and 2.) 
The minimum wage elasticity for the aggregate employment of women 
is negative but not significant. For both full-time and part-time em­
ployment the minimum wage elasticities are negative but not significant. 
This model also suggests the possible impact of children on the hours of 
work decision; the elasticity is negative for full-time employment and 
positive for part-time employment. 
Although redefining the dependent variables altered the sign of 
the minimum wage elasticity for aggregate and full-time employment, none 
of the minimum wage elasticities are significant. Therefore, this 
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TABLE 5a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20f, 1949-1975* 
Change Minimum Wage Change Dependent Variable 
Gramlich (14) E E E/P 
::R 
.028 
(1.3) 
-.0037 
(-.025) 
ZB 
m 
-.0028 
(-1.56) 
-.08 
(-2.0)* 
-.056 
(-6.18)* 
-.056 
(-9.13)* 
.007 
(26-3)* 
.0023 
(19.2)* 
.0012 
(5.94)* 
— .08 
(-2.0)* 
-.327 
(-3.18)* 
-.026 
(.22) 
^1 .022 (1.41) 
.0048 
(.454) 
.0048 
(-.299) 
.011 
(-.96) 
.0032 
(.191) 
.0016 
(.152) 
R2 .999 .999 .999 
d .34 2.02 1.78 
N 108 108 108 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^These elasticities are not reported. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 5 b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 2CH-, 1949-1975 
E/P E 
®R1 -.0976 -.0046 
Ml 
Br2 .1197 B^ .0033 
2R3 .0473 B^ .0012 
BR4 -'0731 BM4 -'0027 
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TABLE 6a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR FULL TIME EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1963-1975* 
Almon lag Unconstrained lag 
Gramlich (14) FT FT/E FT/E FT/E FT/E 
^®R -.004 
(.1) 
-.725 
(-.134) 
.131 
(.212) 
-.256 
(.412) 
-.741 
(.09)b 
Bu -.031 
(-6.8)* 
-.118 
(-.667) 
.077 
(.46) 
— .066 
(-.358) 
.076 
(.017) 
Bt .006 
(4.6)-
-.014 
(-1.34) 
— .068 
(-.69) 
-.047 
(-1.6) 
-.256 
(-.322 
Bt2 0 
(.09) 
0 
(.047) 
.22 
• (1.6) 
-6.35 
(-1.13) 
—8.60 
(-1.41) 
R2 
.997 .129 .129 .078 .089 
d 1.26 2.14 2.13 2.18 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 6b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE FULL-TIME AND PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1963-1975 
FT/E PT/E 
B^^ -1.001 -.5711 
Bj^2 .3724 .5025 
Bj^2 .2103 .2740 
B„, -.3072 -.2343 
R4 
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TABLE 6c 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR FULL-TIME OF WOMEN AGE 204-, 1949-1975 
FT/E FT/E FT/E 
B , -.0014 .0015 -.0291 
ml 
B . .0051 .0051 .0253 
mz 
B , .0045 .0022 .0143 
B , -.0001 -.0039 -.0758 
m4 
ZB .0081 .0049 -.0653 
m 
B c -.0059 -.0103 .1472 Qu 
B , -.0098 -.0139 -.0793 
mo 
B _ -.0088 -.0114 -.0627 
m/ 
B _ .0200 .0235 .0376 
mo 
ZB -.0045 -.0121 .0428 
m 
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TABLE 7a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR PART TIME EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1963-1975® 
Almon lag Unconstrained lag 
Gramlich (14) PT PT/E PT/E PT/E PT/E 
-.100 
(.8) 
-.029 
(.052) 
.142 
(2.29)* 
.164 
(2.65)* 
.161 , 
(2.52)b 
Bu -.034 
(2.1)* 
-.015 
(-.765) 
-.018 
(-1.07) 
—.006 
(-.315) 
-.021 
(.949)t 
Bt -.001 
(.3) 
.003 
(2.75)* 
.036 
(3.8)* 
.075 
(2.64)* 
.104 
(3.20)* 
B,2 0 
(-.64) 
0 
(-.55) 
Bk -1.26 
(2.8)* 
.996 
(1.57) 
.950 
(1.54) 
R2 .985 .999 .791 .800 .808 
d 1.20 1.92 1.74 1.68 
N 52 52 52 52 52 
^t-statistics are in parentheses-
^F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 7b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE PART-TIME EMPLOYMENT FOR WOMEN 
AGE 2CH-, 1963-1975 
PT/E PT/E PT/E 
:ml .0001 -.0004 .0035 
.0013 .0010 .0035 
.0012 .0014 -.0131 
®m4 .0007 .0011 .0130 
ZB 
m 
.0033 .0031 .0069 
^m5 -.0001 .0005 -.0042 
^m6 -.0007 -.0001 .0017 
^m7 
—.0008 -.0004 .0023 
\8 .0021 .0014 .0023 
.0005 .0014 -.0025 
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empirical evidence does not suggest that the employment of adult women 
is adversely affected by this legislation. 
To further explore the importance of the dependent variable spec­
ification, the Gramlich (14) model is also estimated for the time period 
1954 to 1969, the same period as the Mincer (23) study. The first re­
gressions (reported in columns 1 and 2, Tables 8a and 9a) for white and 
nonwhite adult women, used the same dependent variable specification as 
the Gramlich (14) and the second regressions (reported in columns 3 and 
4, Tables 3a and 9a) used Mincer's (23) specification for the dependent 
variables. (The individual 4 quarter minimum wage coefficients are shown 
in Tables 8b and 9b.) 
For white women all of the minimum wage coefficients are positive 
but not significant and for nonwhite women all the minimum wage coeffi­
cients are negative but not significant. The children coefficients also 
suggest that the labor force participation of adult women is not ad­
versely affected by children in the home. 
These results for nonwhite women are conflicting with the original 
re-estimation of the Mincer (23) model. The minimum wage coefficients in 
both the re-estimated Almon lag and the unconstrained lag models (Tables 
1 and 2) are positive for nonwhite women and the minimum wage coeffi­
cients in the Almon lag model are significant. 
Replacing Gramlich's (14) dependent variable specification with 
Mincer's (23) specification does not reconcile the empirical results of 
the two models. Some of the discrepancy may result from the different 
specifications of the minimum wage variable and the lag period. These 
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TABLE 8a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WHITE WOMEN AGE 20+, 1954-1969^ 
LF E LF/P E/P 
::R 
.088 
(.411) 
.108 
(.532) 
.082 
(-471) 
.094 
(.623) 
-.027 
(-1.81) 
-.047 
(-2.9)* 
-.021 
(-1.64) 
-.043 
(-3.57) 
-.061 
(-.231) 
-.022 
(-.076) 
.051 
(.221) 
.152 
(.695) 
.0021 
(5.27)* 
.0021 
(4.78)* 
.001 
(3.06)* 
.001 
(3.3)* 
^1 
.003 
(.286) 
-.002 
(-.162) 
.004 
(.406) 
-.0014 
(-.166) 
®c2 -.001 
(-.093) 
-.007 
(-.633) 
.002 
(.269) 
— .008 
(-.957) 
R2 .999 .999 .999 .999 
d 2.24 1.89 1.70 1.82 
N 64 64 64 64 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
*statiscically significant at 5% level 
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TABLE 8 b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF WHITE WOMEN AGE 20f, 1954-1969 
LF E LF/P E/P 
:Ri -.074 .057 -.029 .085 
.159 .064 .142 .042 
®R3 .073 .015 .047 -.005 
=R4 -.069 -.027 -.079 -.028 
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TABLE 9a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF NONWHITE WOMEN AGE 20+ 
1954-19693 
LF E LF/P E/P 
^R 
-.031 
(-.102) 
-.098 
(-.390) 
-.074 
(—.268) 
-.097 
(-.388) 
Bu .01 
(.723) 
-.044 
(-3.36)* 
-.047 
(-3.21)* 
-.044 
(-3.36)* 
\ .119 (.509) .184 (.844) .629 (2.58)* .184 (.844) 
B 
t 
.0028 
(7.56)* 
.0029 
(8.56)* 
.0013 
(3.41)* 
.003 
(8.56)* 
\l -.006 (.482) 
-.007 
(-.632) 
.006 
(-.432) 
-.007 
(-.632) 
^2 .0016 (.120) 
-.004 
(-.357) 
.011 
(.793) 
-.004 
(-.357) 
R2 .967 .999 .999 .999 
d 2.09 1.86 2.04 1.86 
N 64 64 64 64 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 9b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF NONWHITE WOMEN AGE 20+, 1954-1969 
LF E LF/P E/P 
®R1 -.245 -.223 .051 -.222 
.231 .166 -.381 .166 
®R3 .110 .073 -.055 .073 
»R4 -.127 -.113 .311 -.113 
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results also suggest the estimates may be sensitive to the inclusion of 
the children variable. 
In an attempt to clarify the impact of minimum wage legislation on 
the employment and labor force participation of adult women and to fur­
ther reconcile the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) studies, several other 
models are estimated. 
The first one estimates the Mincer (23) model for aggregate, full-
time and part-time employment for the same years as the Gramlich (14) 
study. The results are shown in Tables 6aand 7a, column 3 and Table 10 
column 1. (The individual 8 quarter minimum wage coefficients are shown 
in Table 10b, 6 c, and 7b, column 1.) 
For aggregate employment and full-time employment, the minimum 
wage elasticity is positive but not significant. The minimum wage elas­
ticity for part-time employment is positive and significant. As com­
pared to Gramlich's (14) results (Table 3a, column 1 and Table 4a, columns 
1 and 2), only the sign of the minimum wage elasticity for part-time 
employment is reversed. As compared to the re-estimation of Gramlich 
(14) (Table 3a columns 2 and 3, and Table 4a colimns 3 and 4) , the 
Tm'm'Tmnn wage elasticities for both part-time and aggregate employment are 
reversed. This suggests that the empirical results may be sensitive to 
the specification of the minimum wage and its lag. 
To further examine these two empirical models, the aggregate, full-
time and part-time employment decisions are estimated by combining the 
Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) studies. 
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TABLE 10a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1949-1975^ 
E/P E/P 
ZB .0288 .0448 
° (1.64) (2.55)* 
ZBjj -.049 -.0766 
(-10.9)* (-17.06)* 
Bg .0756 .081 
(19.4)* (19.1)* 
\2 0 
(.24) 
B. .101 
(1.76) 
R2 .979 .990 
d 1.39 1.39 
N 108 108 
^t-scatistics are in parentheses. 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 10b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - ALMON LAG MINIMDM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 2CH-, 1950-1975 
E/P E/P 
B 
ml 
B 
m2 
B 
m3 
B 
m4 
ZB 
m 
B 
m5 
B 
m6 
B 
m7 
B 
'mS 
ZB 
m 
-.00003 
-.0002 
.00001 
.0003 
.00008 
.0006 
.0007 
.0006 
-.0011 
.0008 
-.00002 
-.0001 
.0002 
.0005 
.0004 
.0007 
.0008 
.0006 
-.0011 
.001 
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First the Grarnlich (14) model is estimated with the exception of 
using a 4 quarter lag Mincer (23) minimum wage variable. The results 
are reported in Table 5a, column 2. (The individual 4 quarter minimum 
wage coefficients are reported in Table 5b, column 2.) The minimum wage 
elasticity is negative but not significant. This suggests that the 
specification of the minimum wage variable may affect the empirical re­
sults. 
Secondly, the Mincer (23) model is estimated for the Gramlich (14) 
time period with the exception of using an unconstrained 8 quarter lag 
minimum wage variable. The results are reported in Table 11a and Tables 
6aand 7a, column 5. (The individual minimum wage coefficients for the 
8 quarters are in Table lib and Tables 6c and 7b, column 3.) All of the 
minimum wage elasticities are positive and for aggregate employment, the 
elasticity is significant. 
These results support the earlier evidence that minimum wage legis­
lation does not adversely affect the employment or labor force partici­
pation of adult women. A comparison of these results with the re-estima­
tion of the Gramlich (14) model (Table 5a, column 3 and Tables 6a and 7a, 
column 2) also suggests the specification of the minimum wage variable 
may create some of the discrepancies in the Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) 
results. 
Thirdly, the Mincer (23) model is estimated over the Gramlich (14) 
time period with the exceptions of using an unconstrained 4 quarter 
lagged tn-îninniTTi wage variable and the children variable. These results 
are in Table 12a. (The individual 4 quarter minimum wage coefficients are 
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TABLE lia 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1949-1975* 
LF/P E/P 
.0832 
(7.25)b* 
.064 
(6.37)b* 
-.0021 
(.09)b 
-.0312 
(25.29)b* 
Be .189 
(13.03)* 
.162 
(13.07)* 
®t2 0 
(-1.7) 
0 
(-1.05) 
R2 .961 .966 
N 108 108 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE lib 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - LAG MINIMDM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1950-1975 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
:ml -.0016 -.0011 -.002 • -.0014 
.0017 .0018 .0016 .0017 
.0007 .0003 .0007 .0003 
.0009 .0003 .001 .001 
.0017 .0013 
^m5 -.0022 -.0014 
®in6 .0018 .0013 
.0001 .0007 
^m8 .0013 .0002 
.001 .0008 
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TABLE 12 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1949-1975^ 
LF/P E/P 
ZB .0416 .0384 
° (2.76)b (3.44)0 
B -.0068 -.0345 
(-1.05) (-6.00)* 
B .216 .205 
^ (16.26)* (3.76)* 
B^ .352 .267 
(4.42)* (3.76)* 
r2 .964 .964 
N 108 108 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
"F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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in Table lib, columns 3 and 4.) The minimum wage elasticities are 
positive for both the labor force and employment equations. The chil­
dren elasticities are also positive and significant- Comparing these 
results with the results of the Gramlich (14) model reported in Table 
5a, column 3 and the results of the Mincer (23) models reported in Tables 
10a and ]]a suggests the importance of the specification of the minimum 
wage. All of the minimum wage elasticities in these Mincer (23) models 
are positive while the Gramlich (14) model has a negative minimum wage 
elasticity. 
These results also suggest that the estimates are somewhat sen­
sitive to the inclusion of the children variable. None of the signs 
are reversed but the magnitudes do vary. 
To further explore the importance of the specification of the time 
trend variable, the Mincer (23) model, with the exception of substituting 
the children variable for the quadratic time trend variable is estimated 
for the Gramlich (14) time period. The results are in Table 10a, column 
2 and Tables 6a and column 4. (The individual 8 quarter minimum wage 
coefficients are in Tables 10b, 6c, and 7b, column 2.) 
For aggregate employment and part time employment the minimum wage 
elasticity is positive and significant. The minimum wage elasticity is 
negative but not significant for full-time employment. The children 
elasticities in these results suggest a possible positive effect on the 
decision to work part time. 
The inclusion of the children variable altered only the sign of 
the minimum wage elasticity for full time employment but did not alter 
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the statistical significance of this variable. However, the magnitudes 
of the variables do differ. 
Finally, the Mincer (23) model is estimated for the period 1954 to 
1975. Since the results of the replications of the Mincer (23) model 
indicate that the Almon lag procedure may affect the minimum wage co­
efficients, this last model uses an unconstrained 8 quarter lag minimum 
wage variable. The time period is extended to increase the number of 
observations. The results are in Table 13a. (The individual quarter 
minimum wage coefficients are in Table 13b.) 
With the exception of the labor force participation of white women, 
all the minimum wage elasticities are positive but none are significant. 
Summarizing these empirical results, it does not appear that mini­
mum wage legislation adversely affects the labor force participation or 
aggregate employment of adult women in the long run. Although some of 
the regressions have negative minimum wage coefficients, none of these 
is significant. For the aggregate employment regressions all but one 
of the negative minimum wage coefficients occur in the regressions that 
include the children variable. (The exception is the equation of the 
Mincer (23) model for the time period 1954 to 1975, Table 13a.) Also 
with the same exception, all of the negative minimum wage coefficients 
occur in the regressions that use a 4 quarter Almon lag for the minimum 
wage variable and a separate coverage variable. Since none of the co­
efficients for the coverage variable is significant, the inclusion of 
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TABLE 13a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WHITE AND NONWHITE WOMEN 
AGE 2(H-, 1954-19753 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
ZB -.0003 .0007 , .0103 , .0827 ^  
m (.0008)b (.005)% (.067)% (2.69)% 
ZB -.0699 -.0369 .022 -.0542 
u (2.90)b (41.87)% (8.42)b* (36.9)% 
.1232 .1232 .066 .0572 L (10.40)* (10.26)* (4.18)* (3.13)* 
B[2 0 0 0 0 
(3.16)* (2.39)* (-2.62)* (-3.11)* 
R2 .973 .972 .645 .697 
N 88 88 88 88 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 13b 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS - MINIMUM WAGE VARIABLE 
FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT OF WHITE AND NONWHITE 
WOMEN AGE 2CH-, 1954-1975 
White Nonwhite 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
"ml .0004 -.0005 -.0019 -.0006 
-.0004 .0004 .002 .0012 
^3 .0002 .0003 -.0003 -.0004 
.0009 .0005 -.00003 .0017 
ZB 
m 
.0011 .0007 -.0002 .0019 
\5 -.0027 -.0023 -.0005 -.0007 
"m6 .0022 .0021 .0009 -.0005 
-.0005 .00002 -.0012 .0011 
®m8 -.0002 -.0005 .0013 .0006 
ZB 
m 
-.0012 -.00068 .0005 .0005 
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separate variable adds little to the determination of the impact of 
minimum wages on the labor force participation decision and aggregate 
employment of adult women. 
For the distribution of employment between full time and part 
time, the signs of the minimum wage coefficients are mixed but three of 
the five part time coefficients are positive and significant. The 
negative coefficients for part-time employment occur in the estimations 
that use a 4 quarter Almon lag minimum wage variable. 
Since not all of the regressions that include the children variable 
have negative minimum wage coefficients, this analysis suggests that the 
specification of the lag period within the Almon lag procedure may in­
fluence the empirical results. 
An examination of the individual quarter minimum wage coefficient 
pattern for aggregate employment suggests that frequently at least two 
of the four subsequent quarters have negative coefficients and generally 
the first quarter coefficient is negative. This implies that minimum 
wages may have an adverse effect on the employment of adult women in the 
short run, but not in the long run. 
The individual minimum wage coefficients in unconstrained lag 
models also suggest the use of the Almon lag minimum wage variable may 
influence the empirical results. Again, in general, the coefficient for 
the first quarter is negative. But, with one exception, the estimations 
that use the unconstrained lag pattern for the minimum wage variable, 
either an 8 or 4 quarter lag, have positive minimum wage coefficients 
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(IBm). (The exception is the equation for the Mincer (23) model for 
the labor force participation of white women. Table 13a.) 
Therefore, constraining the lag pattern of the Mni™™ wage vari­
able may alter the measured impact of this legislation. 
All of this does suggest that if Tm'm'mtTm wages do adversely affect 
the labor force participation and employment of adult women, the effect 
is short run in nature and not very significant. The long run pattern 
of the adult female labor force does not appear to be adversely affected. 
In terms of the distribution of employment, minimum wage legisla­
tion seems to augment the part-time employment of adult women in the 
long run. An analysis of the individual minimum wage coefficients re­
veals a different pattern for the distribution of employment. 
For the 8 quarter Almon lag variables, minimum wage legislation 
has a lagged adverse effect on both the full-time and part-time employ­
ment of adult women. However, the lag pattern is not as pronounced for 
full-time employment and the adverse effect does not appear in the total 
effect for part-time employment. The same basic lag pattern appears in 
the regressions that use an unconstrained lag for the minimum wage vari­
able. For the 4 quarter Almon lag variables, there is no distinct lag 
pattern. The estimation of the original Gramlich (14) model suggests 
an Immediate adverse effect on part-time employment and a positive af­
fect on full-time employment. The estimation of the Gramlich (14) model 
with the redefined dependent variables indicates an immediate adverse 
effect on both full-time and part-time employment. 
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The differences in the 4 quarter and 8 quarter lag patterns for 
full-time and part-time employment again suggest that the specification 
of the lag period and the use of the Almon lag pattern may influence 
the empirical results. 
An analysis of the estimates of the impact of minimum wages on 
the labor force participation and employment of adult women by race 
suggests there is no differential impact. Both estimates of the 
Mincer (23) model indicate no adverse effect for either white and non-
white adult women. In the estimation of the Gramlich (14) model, the 
minimum wage coefficients for the labor force participation and employ­
ment of nonwhite women are negative but not significant. An analysis 
of the individual 8 quarter minimum wage coefficients for nonwhite 
women reveals that in the unconstrained lag models, the sums of the 
first 4 quarter lags are negative for both the labor force and employ­
ment for the period 1954 to 1969 and for the labor force for the period 
1954 to 1975. In both the constrained and unconstrained 8 quarter lag 
models, minimum wages have an immediate adverse effect on the labor 
force participation and employment of nonwhite women. For white women 
the immediate effect is negative only for their employment. This 
pattern for white women does not appear in the 4 quarter Almon lag 
models. 
These empirical results also suggest a negative relationship 
between the aggregate labor force participation and the unemployment 
rate. For full-time employment, the unemployment elasticities for the 
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Mincer (23) model and the original Gramlich (14) model are positive 
but not significant while all the unemployment elasticities for part-
time employment are negative. This suggests that the full-time employ­
ment of adult women may be less sensitive than their part-time employ­
ment to the cyclical nature of the economy. 
The last point of interest in these empirical estimates is the 
relationship between the presence of children and the labor force par­
ticipation and employment of adult women. 
The estimates of the original Gramlich (14) models suggest that 
the presence of children does adversely affect the labor force partici­
pation and employment of adult women. However, the estimates of the 
Gramlich (14) model with the Mincer (23) dependent variables cast some 
doubt on the earlier Gramlich (14) results. The results of these re­
gressions suggest part-time employment is positively related to young 
children in the family. Theoretically, this is the expected effect of 
children in the home and the full-time employment relationship is ex­
pected to be negative. 
Therefore, this study implies that young children do not neces­
sarily discourage women from participating in the labor market but that 
children do encourage women to seek part-time employment as opposed to 
full- time. 
Finally, most of the linear time trend elasticities are positive 
and significant for aggregate and part- time employment and the labor 
force participation. Most of the quadratic time trend elasticities are 
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zero and insignificant. The substitution of the children variable for 
the quadratic time trend results in mixed signs for this variable and 
some are significant. Although some of the magnitudes of the elas­
ticities appear to be sensitive to the inclusion of this variable, it 
is not clear that this variable captures the behavior of the labor 
force and employment of adult women any better. 
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CHAPTER VI-
EXTENDED TIME SERIES MODEL 
The previous section's analysis demonstrated that the existing 
empirical estimates of the impact of minimum wages leave something to 
be desired. Due to the questionable estimation procedures, there are 
still inconsistencies in the results. In this section I will develop 
a more complete empirical model by the addition of some control vari­
ables and the use of a dependent variable which is conditional on 
marital status. The extended time series model explores the impact of 
minimum wages on the employment and labor force participation of adult 
women, on the employment and labor force participation of adult women 
by marital status and on the labor force participation of adult women 
by age and marital status. (Employment data by age and marital status 
is not available.) There is some evidence that the labor force and 
employment behavior of adult women are influenced by marital status and 
since the data are available, the model will attempt to differentiate 
these behaviors. 
An attempt is made to control for several economic variables 
which Mincer (23) and Gramlich (14) abstracted from. This includes a 
female wage variable, an educational attainment variable, an occupa­
tional mix variable, and the price of domestic service, as discussed 
in Chapter IV. However, due to the problem of intercorrelation among 
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the variables, several specifications are estimated. If the Durbin-
Watson statistic is close to or less than one, an autoregressive pro­
cedure is used to adjust for the serial correlation. The simplest model 
regresses the labor force or employment ratios on the current and lagged 
minimum wage, the female full-time earnings, the unemployment rate of 
men age 35 to 54 and, where applicable, the husband's income, average 
aid for dependent children payment, and the presence of children. This 
basic model includes one variable each for (a) female earnings poten­
tial, (b) an alternative source of income, and (c) household respon­
sibilities. 
To further control for the effects of female earnings and the 
demand for female labor, the same model plus either the educational or 
occupational variable are estimated. Finally, the basic model plus 
both the educational and occupational variable are estimated. As men­
tioned earlier, the children variable is also redefined as the ratio 
of ever married women with children ever bom to all women in an 
attempt to better measure its effect. 
The inclusion of these additional variables did not significantly 
alter the estimates of the basic regression model and with one excep­
tion, were not statistically significant. (The occupational variable 
was significant for married women.) Therefore,only the results of the 
basic time series model will be reported here. The results are shown 
in Tables 14, 15 and 16. (The estimated elasticities of the other 
three models are shown in Tables 23, 24 and 25 in the Appendix.) 
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TABLE 14 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF SINGLE WOMEN AGE 14+® 
LF/P LF/pb E/P E/P^ 
-.179 
(-1.06) 
.062 
(.436) 
-.179 
(-.957) 
.028 
(.15) 
-.339 
(-2.07)* 
-.105 
(-.905) 
-.302 
(-1.71) 
-.102 
(-.710) 
-.524 
(5.76)c* 
-.0013 
(.039)= 
-.481 
(4.20)C 
-.074 
(.097) 
®RWA .404 (2.19)* 
.727 
(3.00)* 
.404 
(1.30) 
.404 
(1.90) 
:R -.029 (-.588) 
.051 
(1.22) 
-.037 
(-.677) 
.036 
(.701) 
R2 .549 .342 .399 .199 
d .883 1.33 1.02 1.58 
N 28 27 28 27 
^c-statistics are in parentheses. 
^Adjusted for serial correlation of residuals. 
^?-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 15 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF MARRIED WOMEN AGE 14+& 
LF/P E/P E/pb 
B 
m 
-.037 
(-.542) 
.015 
(.240) 
-.007 
(-.079) 
"nil .154 (1.58) 
.142 
(1.56) 
.022 
(.307) 
.117 
(.718): 
.157 
(1.51): 
.014 
(.015) 
®RWA .807 (1.65) 
.404 
(.522) 
1.53 
(10.8) 
"R 
.097 
(4.52)* 
.056 
(2.88)* 
.013 
(.501) 
V 
.780 
(2.09)* 
1.20 
(3.15)* 
1.20 
(3.12)* 
-.288 
(-.302) 
-.772 
(-.886) 
-.77 
(-.880) 
R2 .978 .98 .859 
d 1.91 1.12 1.495 
N 28 28 27 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^Adjusted for serial correlation of residuals. 
'^F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 16 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF OTHER MARRIED WOMEN 
AGE 14+, 1950-1977® 
LF/P E/P 
B 
m 
— .216 
(-2.80)* 
-.092 
(-1.15) 
-.003 
(-.031) 
.123 
(1.70) 
ZB 
m 
-.216 
(3.88)b 
.031 
(.178)^ 
®RWA .0404 (.094) 
— .404 
(-1.27) 
®R .017 
(.607) 
.007 
(.258) 
®ADC .0106 (.03) 
.475 
(1.63) 
.272 
(.689) 
-.097 
(-.272) 
R2 .410 .272 
d 1.98 2.18 
N 28 28 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-sCaciscics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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The dependent variables were grouped first by marital status for 
women age fourteen and older and then by marital status and age; the 
age categories are twenty to twenty-four, twenty-five to thirty-four, 
thirty-five to forty-four. 
Women 14+ by Marital Status 
For single women age fourteen and older, the aggregate minimum 
wage elasticities (ZBm) are negative but not significant- The earnings 
elasticities are positive and for the labor force, the elas­
ticity is significant. The unemployment elasticity (B^^) are positive 
but not significant. 
For married women age fourteen and older, the aggregate minimum 
wage elasticities are positive but not significant. However, for the 
labor force and employment the current minimum wage elasticity is 
negative. The earnings elasticities are positive, and for employment, 
significant. The unemployment and husband's income (B ) elasticities iiy 
are positive. With the exception of the unemployment elasticity, for 
employment, the elasticities are significant. The children elastic­
ities (Bj,) are negative but not significant. The regression for mar­
ried women also have the best fit in terms of the R^. 
For other married women (widowed, divorced and married husband 
absent) age fourteen and olde:^ the aggregate minimum wage elasticity 
is negative for the labor force and positive for employment- However, 
neither is significant. Also both current minimum wage elasticities 
are negative. The earnings elasticities are mixed in sign but none 
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is significant. Both unemployment elasticities are positive but not 
significant. The welfare elasticities are positive but not 
significant and the children elasticity is positive for the labor 
force and negative for employment. Neither elasticity is significant. 
This empirical analysis suggests that minimum wage legislation 
does have a differential impact. The labor force participation and 
employment of single women may be adversely affected by this legisla­
tion, as may be the labor force participation of other married women. 
Yet the married women's labor force participation is largely unaf­
fected. 
The theoretical analysis of minimum wages suggests that the 
legislation creates three effects; displacement, unemployment, and 
labor force withdrawal. This empirical analysis suggests that many 
single and other married women chose to withdraw from the labor force 
when faced with the lower uncovered sector wage. It also suggests 
that single women suffer the greatest displacement and therefore un­
employment as a result of the legislation. This may be due to the 
distribution of age within the single category; a large proportion of 
these women are under twenty-five. These are the women with the least 
amount of job experience or training and are the most likely candi­
dates for displacement- These women also have an alternative to market 
work in the form of future educational or training programs. There­
fore they are the most likely to withdraw from the labor force. 
These empirical results verify the positive relationship between 
the earnings potential (female wage) and the labor force participation 
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decision. The results also suggest that the participation decision 
and employment of women are not highly sensitive to the cyclical 
nature of the economy. Previous ençirical studies suggest that female 
labor force participation is adversely affected by unemployment. How­
ever, these results suggest that single women are the only group whose 
employment may be adversely affected and this may be due to the age 
distribution and associated characteristics of these women. The un­
employment coefficients for married women are positive and significant. 
This implies a significant added worker effect; married women are drawn 
into the labor force during economic downturns as a means of providing 
a secondary source of income. Also most employed women are not employed 
in the construction or manufacturing industries which are highly 
sensitive to economic cycles. Therefore, their aggregate employment 
may be somewhat insensitive to economic cycles; any adjustment in their 
employment may be in hours of employment, not number of employed. 
These empirical results also suggest that the presence of chil­
dren may discourage some women from working. However, none of the 
coefficients are significant. Before concluding that children in the 
home are not a major deterrent to market work, consideration must be 
given to the age distribution of the women and therefore the age dis­
tribution of the children. Since the dependent variable includes all 
women 14 and older, the effect of older children in the home may be 
offsetting the effect of younger children in the home. 
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Finally, the results imply that married women's and other mar­
ried women's labor force participation is not adversely affected by 
an alternative source of income. In fact, for married women the re­
sults imply the greater her husband's income, the greater the incen­
tive to participate in the labor force. This relationship may be due 
to a possible correlation in their educational attainment and there­
fore their expected earnings; the women most likely to participate in 
the labor force due to their education and expected earnings marry men 
with similar educational and expected earnings background. For other 
married women, the availability of welfare income does not signifi­
cantly reduce their incentive to seek employment. These results sug­
gest that many families prefer two incomes, either to attain or pos­
sibly maintain a desired standard of living. 
Women by Age and Marital Status 
To further explore the impact of minimum wages and other factors 
on the labor force participation of adult women, the marital groups 
are divided into three age categories; 20 to 24, 25 to 34, and 35 to 44. 
The percentage of the labor force in some of the marital status and 
age groups is small and this should be kept in mind when interpreting 
the results The results for single women are in Table 17, for mar­
ried women in Table 18, and for other married women in Table 19. 
^The average percentages of the labor force in each marital 
status and age group are for age 20-24; single 48%, married 43%, 
other 5%, for age 25-34; single 19%, married 65%, other 16%, and for 
age 35 to 44; single 9%, married 72%, and other 19%. 
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TABLE 17 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIEIiTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF SINGLE WOMEN, 1950-1977* 
20-24 25-34 35-44 
B 
m 
-.059 
(-1.34) 
-.046 
(-.979) 
.096 
(2.31)* 
^ml .009 (.243) 
-.089 
(-2.09)* 
.006 
(.162) 
ZB 
m 
-.049 
(.786)b (5.56)0 
.102 ^  
(3.87)» 
®RWA -.4037 (-3.93)* 
-.1211 
(-1.91) 
-.4037 
(-4.25)* 
^R 
-.0114 
(-.710) 
-.0143 
(-.825) 
.0532 
(3.47)* 
R2 .484 .224 .770 
d 1.71 2.63 2.06 
N 28 28 28 
^t-statistics are Ln parentheses. 
^F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 18 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS - LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF MARRIED WOMEN BY AGE^ 
20-24 25-34 25-34^ 35-44 35-44% 
Bm .089 
(1.69) 
-.108 
(-1.10) 
-.049 
(-.434) 
— .086 
(-1.14) 
-.059 
(-.692) 
.216 
(3.16)* 
-.02 
(-1.97( 
-.022 
(-.168) 
.052 
(.661) 
.052 
(.505) 
.305 
(14.24)" 
-.308 
(-5.37)C* 
-.071 
(.120)C 
-.034 
(.07)c 
— .006 
(.003)c 
®RWA -1.62 
(-4.11)* 
1.62 
(5.25)* 
1.17 
(2.15)* 
.807 
(2.99)* 
.727 
(1.74) 
:R 
.047 
(3.14)* 
.065 
(2.15)* 
.068 
(1.98) 
.061 
(2.44)* 
.046 
(1.72) 
V 1.80 (9.09)* 
-.120 
(-.404) 
.600 
(1.19) 
.600 
(1.52) 
.540 
(1.34) 
-2.6 
(-9-43)* 
1.02 
(1.26) 
-.996 
(-.743) 
.402 
(.665) 
.217 
(.210) 
R2 .991 .962 .920 .961 .927 
d 2.81 .982 1.38 .868 1.316 
N 28 28 27 28 27 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
b 
Adjusted for serial correlation of residuals. 
c 
F-statistic-
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 19 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF OTHER MARRIED WOMEN, 1950-1977* 
20-24 25-34 35-44 
B 
m 
.019 
(.163) 
-.028 
(-.275) 
.001 
(.022) 
:ml .208 (1.75) 
.028 
(.264) 
.019 
(.458) 
ZB 
m 
-231 
(2.17)b 
0 
(0)b 
.019 , 
(.124)0 
®RWA -.4037 (-.933) 
.0404 
(.048) 
.4037 
(.920) 
.0571 
(1.37) 
.0349 
(.881) 
.0257 
(1.53) 
®ADC 1.06 (2.58)* 
.7396 
(1.66) 
.0528 
(.374) 
.0001 
(.0001) 
-1.30 
(-2.61)* 
-.337 
(-1.80) 
R2 .708 .602 .390 
d 2.16 1.69 1.67 
N 28 28 28 
a 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
b 
F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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(The estimated coefficients for the other three models are in Tables 
26 to 34 in the Appendix.) 
As anticipated, for single women, the aggregate minimum wage 
elasticities (ZBm) are negative and for the second age group, the elas­
ticity is significant. However, for the single women age thirty-five 
to forty-four, the minimum wage elasticities are all positive and the 
current minimum wage elasticity is significant. All of the earnings 
elasticities are negative and for the single women age twenty 
to twenty-four and age thirty-five to forty-four the elasticities are 
significant. The unemployment elasticities (Bu) are negative but not 
significant for the first two age groups but positive and significant 
for the eldest group. 
For married women, the aggregate minimum wage elasticities are 
negative for the two older age groups. For the youngest group of mar­
ried women, the minimum wage elasticity is positive and significant. 
However, the earnings elasticity for this group is negative and sig­
nificant. For the other two age groups the earnings elasticities are 
positive and for the twenty-five to thirty-four age group, the elas­
ticity is significant. All of the unemployment elasticities are 
positive and, for the youngest group, significant. The husband's in­
come elasticity (B_ ) is positive and significant for the youngest 
Hy 
group and positive for the other groups. The children elasticity (B^) 
is negative and significant for the youngest group. For the second 
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age group, the elasticity is negative and for the third age group, the 
elasticity is positive. Neither is significant. 
For the other married women group, all the aggregate minimum wage 
elasticities are positive but none are significant. The earnings elas­
ticity is negative for the youngest group and positive for the other 
two groups. None are significant. All of the unemployment elasticities 
are positive but not significant. All the welfare elasticities 
are positive, and for the twenty to twenty-four age group, the welfare 
elasticity is significant. The children elasticity is negative for the 
two eldest groups and is significant for the twenty-five to thirty-four 
age group. However, for the youngest group, the children elasticity is 
positive but not significant. Again, even broken down by age, the model 
worked better in terms of the for married women. 
Suïïmfiry of the Results by Marital Status 
The empirical analysis of the labor force participation of women 
by age and marital status suggests that minimum wage legislation may 
have an adverse effect on the labor force participation of women but 
that impact is discriminate. Young single women seem to be the most 
adversely affected while older women regardless of marital status seem 
to be the least affected. Theoretically this seems the appropriate 
response. Young women have the least job experience and are the most 
likely candidates for displacement and labor force withdrawal. They 
also have an alternative in the form of further education or training. 
Older women, with more job experience, may be more protected from the 
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displacement effect. Therefore,fewer older women would be forced out 
of the labor market by this legislation. This may also explain why 
other married women seem less affected by the legislation than married 
women. Married women, especially the women age twenty-five to thirty-
four, may be new entrants to the labor force. If these women dropped 
out of the labor force to have children (as the children coefficient 
for married women age twenty to twenty-four suggests), they will not 
have the job experience to protect them from the minimum wage effects. 
Also, married women, especially with children, have an alternative to 
market work; household production. Other married women may not ex­
perience the same turnover and as such may have greater job experience 
than married women of the same age. 
The only unexpected effect of the legislation is that of the 
young married women whose labor force participation is augmented by 
the legislation. A probable explanation may be the need for a second 
source of income in a newly established household and the higher min­
imum wage draws these women into the labor force. 
This empirical analysis also suggests that young adult women are 
not drawn into the labor force by the expected market wage. A prob­
able explanation for this involves the human capital investment analy­
sis. For women in this age group, further education or training will 
enhance their future earnings potential and this is a more important 
factor in their labor force participation decision than is the current 
market wage. For married and other married women in the twenty-five 
to thirty-four and the thirty-five to forty-four age groups, the 
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expected wage is positively related to their labor force participation 
decision. Somewhat surprisingly, the three groups of single women are 
not drawn into the labor force by the expected wage. Yet in the pre­
vious analysis, the labor force participation of single women as a 
group was enhanced by the expected wage rate. Many single women, other 
than the young single women, would not have an alternative means of 
support. Therefore, their labor force participation decision may be 
somewhat independent of the wage rate. Over time their labor force 
participation is much more constant than that of married women or other 
married women, suggesting that the upward trend in female wages has 
not significantly altered their participation decision. This may also 
explain why the labor force participation of single women is not highly 
sensitive to economic cycles. 
For married women, the positive unemployment elasticities rein­
force the idea of the added worker hypothesis. These results are con­
sistent with the Mitchell (24) time series results and suggest that the 
labor force participation of married women responds differently than 
other women to cyclical changes. 
The labor force participation of married women and other married 
women in the age categories 25 to 34 and 35 to 44 is not sig­
nificantly affected by the availability of other income. However, the 
labor force participation of young married and young other married 
women is significantly and positively related to the availability of 
other income. Due to the collinearity in the time series, it appears 
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difficult to disentangle the independent effects of changes in women's 
earnings from those of her husband's income and welfare supplements. 
Finally, the presence of children adversely affects the labor 
force participation of young married women and other married women. 
This suggests that the presence of young children does govern the 
choice between market and nonmarket work for adult women and that 
possibly women with children who have an alternate source of income 
may choose not to work in the market. 
Women Age 20 and Older 
Finally, the extended time series model is applied to the quar­
terly labor force participation and employment data for women age 
twenty and older. Since this quarterly data is not available by 
marital status and the majority of these women are married, the model 
used in this application is the same as the one used for married women. 
The quarterly data for the husband's income, female earnings, and the 
presence of children are obtained by interpolation of the annual data. 
The data for the mi ni mm wage and unemployment are the data used in 
the previous quarterly analysis. An auto regressive procedure is used 
if the original Durbin-Watson statistic is close to or less than one. 
The results for all women are reported in Table 20a, for women by race 
in TableZla, and for full-time and part-time employment in Table 22a. 
(The individual 8 quarter minimum wage coefficients are reported in 
Tables 20b, 21b, and 22b.) 
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TABLE 20a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 20, 1950-1977* 
LF/P LF/pb E/P E/pb 
.028 
(.393)= 
.029 
(.214) = 
.015 
(.059)C 
-.0019 
(.002) = 
.013 
(4.14)=* 
-.013 
(4.33)=* 
-.013 
(4.02)c* 
-.037 
(33.97)* 
®RWA -.404 
(-1.73) 
-.283 
(-1.45) 
-.121 
(-.825) 
-.121 
(-.720) 
V .420 (9.23)* .360 (6.18)* .600 (7.61)* .300 (4.99)* 
-.620 
(-6.64)* 
-.710 
(6.06)* 
-.544 
(-5.97)* 
-.645 
(-5.63)* 
R2 .965 .924 .962 .920 
d .882 1.49 .893 1.44 
N 112 111 112 111 
a 
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^Adjusted for serial correlation of residuals, 
c 
F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 20b 
LAG REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 204-, 1954-1977 
LF/P LF/pa E/P E/pa 
Bm -.0018 -.0018 -.0017 -.0021 
Bm^ .0019 .0014 .0022 .0018 
Bm^ .00001 .00035 —.0006 -.00022 
Bm^ .0015 .0009 .001 .00038 
Bm, 4 -.0021 -.0018 -.0015 -.0013 
Bm^ .0017 .0013 .0016 .00108 
3*6 .0001 .00019 .0005 .00055 
Bm^ -.00035 .00039 -.0011 -.00029 
^Adjusted for serial correlation. 
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TABLE 21a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WCHEN AGE 2(H-, BY RACE, 1954-1977^ 
White Nonwhite 
LF/P LF/pb E/P E/pb LF/P E/P 
-.094 
(2.51)C 
-.098 
(1.33)c 
-.067 
(1.31)C 
-.081 
(1.26)C 
.067 
(1.03)C 
.165 
(4.47)c* 
.005 
(.365): 
-.017 
(7.58)C* 
-.017 
(4.62)c* 
-.036 
(33.10)c* 
-.004 
(.203)C 
-.037 
(13.1)6* 
®RWA .412 (2.CO)* 
.288 
(1.28) 
.330 
(1.36) 
.247 
(1.10) 
-.247 
(-.977) 
-.288 
(-.999) 
V 
.038 
(.339) 
.063 
(.734) 
.126 
(.955) 
.126 
(.936) 
.251 
(1.98) 
.251 
(1.62) 
-.587 
(-6.34)* 
-.711 
(-6.39)* 
-.538 
(-5.46)* 
-.650 
(-5.52)* 
-.103 
(-.95) 
-.002 
(-.013) 
R2 .967 .922 .959 .917 .606 .626 
d .622 1.52 .615 1.39 1.71 1.45 
N 96 95 96 95 96 96 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
b 
Adjusted for serial correlation of residuals. 
c 
F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 21b 
LAG REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
AND EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN, AGE 204- BY RACE, 1954-1977 
White Nouwhite 
LF/P LF/pa E/P E/pa LF/P E/P 
Bm .0005 -.0005 -.0001 -.0013 .00003 .0011 
Bm^ -.00015 -.0001 .0006 .0008 .0006 .00055 
Bm^ -.0009 -.0003 -.0014 -.0007 .00008 -.0013 
Bm^ .0007 .0003 -.0012 .0004 .0005 .0039 
Bm, 
4 -.0025 -.0018 -.0027 -.0018 -.0005 -.0025 
Bm^ .0007 .00014 .0017 .0008 .0007 .0016 
Bmg .0006 .0003 .0006 .0005 -.00003 .0006 
Bm^ -.0018 -.0009 -.002 -.0011 .0006 .0008 
^Adjusted for serial correlation. 
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TABLE 22a 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR FULL TIME AND PART TIME 
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 20+, 1963-1977^ 
FT/E PT/E 
ZB -5.47 -5.29 
m 
u 
Hy 
(1.65)b (29.91)t* 
ZB -.586 -.168, 
(1.30)b (2.04)t 
B 26.59 24.82 
^ (1.44) (5.60)* 
B_ -18.66 -9.67 
(-1.63) (-3.71)* 
B 7.38 9.29 
(1.13) (6.21)* 
R2 .209 .828 
d 2.16 2.19 
N 60 60 
^t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^F-statistic. 
*Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 22b 
LAG REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE FULL TIME AND PART TIME 
EMPLOYMENT OF WOMEN AGE 204-, 1963-1977 
FT/E PT/E 
Bm -.1019 -.064 
Bm^ -.0098 -.0305 
Bm^ .0289 .0144 
Bm^ -.0811 -.0429 
Bm, 4 .1224 
.0375 
Bm^ -.0408 -.0510 
Bm, 
o 
-.1017 .0520 
Bm^ .0359 -.0595 
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For the aggregate labor force participation of adult women, the 
minimum wage elasticity (ZBm) is positive while the minimum wage 
elasticity for aggregate employment is negative. Neither elasticity 
is significant. Both unemployment elasticities (ZBu) are negative and 
significant. The earnings elasticities are negative but not signifi­
cant. The elasticities for the husband's income (B^^) are positive 
and significant while the children elasticities (B^O are negative and 
significant. 
For white women both the labor force and employment minimum wage 
elasticities are negative but not significant. The minimum wage elas­
ticities are positive for nonwhite women and the elasticity for em­
ployment is significant. All of the unemployment elasticities are 
negative and except for the labor force equation of nonwhite women, 
the elasticities are significant. The earnings elasticities are posi­
tive for white women and negative for nonwhite women but none are sig­
nificant. All of the children elasticities are negative but only 
significant for white women. 
For the distribution of employment, the minimum wage elastici­
ties are negative for both full-time and part-time employment. The 
elasticity is significant for part time employment. Both unemployment 
elasticities are negative but neither is significant. Both earnings 
elasticities are positive and, for part-time employment, the elas­
ticity is significant. The husband's income elasticities are negative 
but not significant. The children elasticities are positive and for 
part time employment the elasticity is significant. 
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Although some of the minimum wage elasticities are negative, only 
for part-time employment are the coefficients significant. This sug­
gests that minimum wage legislation does not adversely affect the labor 
force participation of adult women in the long run. However, contrary 
to the earlier quarterly results, these results suggest that part-time 
employment is not augmented by this legislation. However, the earnings 
elasticity for part-time ençloyment is positive and significant. The 
earnings variable measures full-time median annual earnings and there­
fore overestimates the return to part-time work. The minimum wage vari­
able may more closely approximate the return to part-time work and the 
possible collinearity between the two wage variables makes it difficult 
to separate the two effects. 
As in the previous quarterly models, the unemployment elasticities 
are negative, suggesting that as an aggregate group the labor force 
participation of adult women is adversely related to the cycles of the 
economy. Secondly, these results support the earlier hypothesis that 
the presence of young children in the home encourages part-time employ­
ment. The results also suggest that the availability of another income 
does not act as a deterrent to market work. And, not surprisingly, 
given the results of the marital status analysis, the earnings of women 
do not appear to be a strong incentive for market work. Again the 
collinearity of the income variables may make it difficult to distin­
guish the separate effects. 
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Siiminarv of the Extended Time Series Analysis 
To some degree the results of the extended time series analysis 
of women age 20 and older and the results of the analysis of adult 
women by marital status and age are consistent. Minimum wage legisla­
tion does not appear to adversely affect the labor force participation 
and aggregate employment of adult women. The presence of children in 
the home appears to discourage some women from working. However, the 
results also suggest that the importance of the minimum wage, market 
earnings and unemployment to the labor force participation decision 
varies with age and marital status. 
As mentioned earlier, the signs and significance of the husband's 
income elasticities and female earnings elasticities suggest it is dif­
ficult to separate these effects on the labor force participation and 
employment decisions. Comparing these results with the results of the 
Cain (7) time series analysis of the labor force participation of adult 
women suggests this is not a unique problem. For married women age 
twenty-five to thirty-four and thirty-five to forty-four, his study 
also reports positive coefficients for the husband's income variable 
and positive and significant coefficients for the female earnings vari­
able. For never married women, the earnings coefficients are negative 
but not significant. For other ever married women age thirty-five to 
forty-four, the earnings and welfare coefficients are positive but not 
significant while for other ever married women age twenty-five to 
thirty-four, the earnings coefficient is negative and the welfare 
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coefficient is positive. Neither is significant. The for the never 
married and other ever married women regression is also low. 
124 
CHAPTER VII. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Although my results are mixed, minimum wage legislation appears 
to have an impact on the adult female labor force. However, this im­
pact is discriminate and limited. As an aggregate group, the direction 
of the labor force participation and employment of adult women is un­
affected by the legislation. However, the legislation appears to alter 
the distribution of employment in favor of part-time employment. Pos­
sibly the aggregate employment and labor force participation of adult 
women are not adversely affected because part-time employment provides 
an alternative to remaining unemployed or to withdrawing from the labor 
force. 
The legislation seems to be mere harmful to the young adult 
female labor force, especially young single women, than to that of the 
mature adult female labor force. The educational and job experience 
characteristics of these young adult women are similar to those of 
teenagers and these women have the same alternative to market work in 
an educational or training program that is available to teenagers. 
Therefore these results are not surprising. 
These results also suggest the growing importance of part-time 
work to the female labor force. Whether or not part-time employment 
cushions the impact of minimum wages, it provides an outlet for women 
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with alternative uses for their time or with alternative sources of in­
come. Therefore part-time work may provide a viable source of employ­
ment to the growing number of adult women seeking market work. 
As with any research, there are some shortcomings in this study. 
I have not been able to closely replicate Mincer's (23) regression 
results and the underlying course of the discrepancy is not clear. The 
lack of data on the employment of women by marital status and age pro­
hibited comparing the employment behavior and labor force participation 
behavior of these adult women. The regressions for single and other 
married women have low R^, indicating that not all of the important 
determinants of their labor force participation and enqjloyment deci­
sions have yet been accounted for. It appears it has been difficult 
to disentangle consistently the effects of some of the control vari­
ables. This by itself does not bias the findings of minimum wage vari­
ables as the minimum wage variable has a rachet pattern which is less 
likely to be highly correlated with the control variables used in this 
study. 
The major objective of this study is to test the impact of 
minimum wages While Controlling for a variety of other influences on 
the employment and labor force participation of adult women. In 
Chapter V, the minimum wage effect is tested by using time trend vari­
ables and the specifications of the Mincer C23) and Gramlich (24) 
studies. Chapter VI tests the impact of minimum wages by using addi­
tional control variables. Regardless of the control variables, it 
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does not appear that minimum wage legislation adversely affects the 
aggregate employment or labor force participation of adult women. 
Given the tentative nature of the results, any implications to 
be drawn from this study are also tentative. Although minimum wages 
do not appear to raise or lower the aggregate employment or labor 
force participation of adult women, there is some tentative evidence 
to suggest that minimum wages do encourage adult women to reduce their 
hours of work and this tends to reduce their earnings capacity. This 
may result in a long run adverse effect on the earnings incentive for 
women to investment in human capital and discourage their labor force 
participation. 
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APPENDIX 
TABLE 23 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF SINGLE WOMEN AGE 14+, 1950-1977® 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
-.163 
(-1.03) 
-.154 
(-.914) 
-.163 
(-.983) 
-.185 
(-.989) 
-.209 
(-1.23) 
-.225 
(-1.19) 
«ml -.308 (-2.10)* 
-.277 
(-1.70) 
-.308 
(-1.99) 
-.277 
(-1.50) 
-.290 
(-1.77) 
-.246 
(-1.38) 
-.471 
(5.78)b* 
-.431 
(4.03)® 
-.471 
(5.52)b* 
-. 462 
(3.90)b 
-.493 
(5.60)b* 
-.462 
(4.15)b 
®RWA 1.615 (2.59)* 
1.615 
(2.07)* 
1.615 
(2.51)* 
1.615 
(2.09)* 
.807 
(1.82) 
.807 
(1.73) 
.050 
(.683) 
.0387 
(.463) 
.0504 
(.665) 
.0449 
(.552) 
-.0018 
(-.025) 
.0018 
(.022) 
«0 -1.45 
(-2.04) 
-1.44 
(1.77) 
-1.44 
(-1.67) 
1.18 
(-1.22) 
®E -.1156 
(-.034) 
-1.89 
(-.490) 
-3.14 
(-1.04) 
-4.38 
(-1.33) 
R2 .620 .474 .621 .480 .570 .443 
d 1.06 1.13 1.05 1.09 .847 .978 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 
a t-statistlcs are in parentheses, 
^ F-statistlcs. 
* Statistically significant at 5% level. 
TABLE 24 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT, AGE 14+, 1950-1977® 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
-.216 
(-.395) 
.031 
(.554) 
-.123 
(-.224) 
.043 
(.903) 
-.015 
(-.223) 
.043 
(.796) 
\l .123 (1.58) 
.123 
(1.51) 
.092 
(1.25) 
.092 
(1.09) 
.092 
(1.06) 
.074 
(.983) 
.102 
(.865)b 
.145 . 
(1.84)b 
.092 ^ 
(.641)b 
.136 . 
(1.56)b 
.077 . 
(.436)b 
.117 , 
(1.25)" 
®RWA .404 
(.731) 
-.162 
(-.508) 
.404 
(.748) 
-.162 
(-.563) 
.404 
(1.44) 
.040 
(.102) 
.056 
(1.98) 
.015 
(.539) 
.050 
(1.83) 
.001 
(.286) 
.091 
(3.29)* 
.035 
(1.53) 
®0 1.16 
(3.86) 
.972 
(3.35)* 
.956 
(2.9)* 
.663 
(2.26)* 
^E 
1.34 
(1.40) 
1.99 
(2.34)* 
2.59 
(2.58)* 
2.87 
(3.42)* 
\y .600 (.966) 
.600 
(2.22)* 
.600 
(.902) 
.600 
(2.31)* 
.600 
(1.66) 
.600 
(2.93)* 
Bk .0002 
(.0003) 
-.531 
(-.739) 
.118 
(.161) 
-.356 
(-.544) 
.0002 
(1.02) 
-.531 
(-.573) 
R2 
.987 .987 .989 .99 .984 .987 
d 2.43 1.44 2.42 1.52 2.07 1.36 
N 28 28 28 28 28 28 
® t-statistlcs are In parentheses; ^ F-statlstic; * Statistically significant at 5% level. 
TABLE 25 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF OTHER MARITAL STATUS WOMEN, AGE 14+, 1950-1977* 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
B 
m 
B 
ml 
EB 
m 
B RWA 
R 
B 
E 
®ADC 
Bk 
R2 
d 
N 
- . 2 1 6  
(2.45)* 
-.003 
(-.010) 
- . 216  
(2.96)b 
.004 
(.009) 
.014 
(.371) 
.064 
(.116) 
.019 
(.012) 
-.011 
(-.035) 
-.272 
(.450) 
.410 
2.01 
28 
-.092 
(1.07) 
.123 
(1.60) 
.03] ^  
(.167)b 
-.404 
(-1.05) 
.008 
( .228)  
.061 
( .120)  
-.394 
(-.264) 
.475 
(1.41) 
.097 
(-.257) 
.274 
2.24 
28 
- . 2 1 6  
(-2.57)* 
-.001 
(-.007) 
- . 2 1 6  
(3.15)b 
.004 
(.0084) 
.014 
(.388) 
.067 
(.135) 
-.011 
(-.034) 
.233 
(.465) 
.410 
2.01 
28 
-.092 
(-1.06) 
.123 
(1.64) 
- . 2 1 6  
(.156)b 
-.404 
(-1.07) 
.006 
(.189) 
.008 
(.018) 
.475 
(1.42) 
- . 102  
(-.225) 
.272 
2.18 
28 
- . 2 1 6  
(-2.59)* 
-.003 
(-.044) 
-.216^ 
(3.68)b 
.0404 
(.078) 
.016 
(.499) 
.096 
(.065) 
.001 
(.003) 
.270 
( .660)  
.410 
1.97 
28 
-.092 
(-1.15) 
.123 
(1 .68)  
.037 , ( .161)t 
-.0404 
(-1.17) 
.010 
(.335) 
-.320 
(-.242) 
.475 
(1.57) 
-.087 
(-.236) 
.274 
2.24 
28 
* t-statlstlcs are In parentheses; ^ F-statistics; * Statistically significant. 
TABLE 25 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION AND EMPLOYMENT 
OF OTHER MARITAL STATUS WOMEN, AGE 14+, 1950-1977* 
LF/P E/P LF/P E/P LF/P E/P 
m 
ml 
EB 
m 
RWA 
B R 
«0 
»E 
®ADC 
Bk 
r2 
d 
N 
-.216 -.092 -.216 -.092 -.216 -.092 
(2.45)* (1.07) (-2.57)* (-1.06) (-2.59)* (-1.15) 
-.003 .123 -.001 .123 -.003 .123 
(-.010) (1.60) (-.007) (1.64) (-.044) (1.68) 
-.216 .031 ^ -.216 -.216 -.216^ .037 . 
(2.96)b (.167)b (3.15)b (.156)b (3.68)b (.161)b 
.004 -.404 .004 -.404 .0404 -.0404 
(.009) (-1.05) (.0084) (-1.07) (.078) (-1.17) 
.014 .008 .014 .006 .016 .010 
(.371) (.228) (.388) (.189) (.499) (.335) 
.064 .061 .067 .008 
(.116) (.120) (.135) (.018) 
.019 -.394 .096 -.320 
(.012) (-.264) (.065) (-.242) 
-.011 .475 -.011 .475 .001 .475 
(-.035) (1.41) (-.034) (1.42) (.003) (1.57) 
-.272 .097 .233 -.102 .270 -.087 
(.450) (-.257) (.465) (-.225) (.660) (-.236) 
.410 .274 .410 .272 .410 .274 
2.01 2.24 2.01 2.18 1.97 2.24 
28 28 28 28 28 28 
a t-statistics are in parentheses, 
b F-statistic. 
* Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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TABLE 26 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF SINGLE WOMEN AGE 20-24, 1950-1977* 
B —.062 —.055 -.062 
® (-1.37) (-1.29) (-1.51) 
B .019 .012 .019 
(.419) (.292) (.480) 
EB -.043 , -.043 ^  -.043 , 
(.639)* (.634)0 (.724)° 
B .004 -.012 -.081 
^ (.023) (-.063) (-.579) 
B .002 .001 -.002 
(.117) (.034) (-.131) 
B -.517 -.800 
(-.57) (-1.04) 
B -.130 -.200 
(-.568) (-1.04) 
R2 .515 .508 .508 
d 1.76 1.90 1.61 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
131 
TABLE 27 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF SINGLE WOMEN AGE 25-34, 1950-1977* 
-.04 
(-.839) 
-.043 
(-.930) 
-.049 
(-1.01) 
®ml -.092 
(-1.98) 
-.089 
(-2.04) 
-.092 
(-1.92) 
ZB 
m 
-.132 
(4.90)b* 
-'132 
(5.19)b* 
-.142 
(5.29)b 
®RWA .081 
(.358) 
.081 
(.399) 
-.081 
(-.426) 
®R -.003 
(-.135) 
-.002 
(-.110) 
-.011 
(-.554) 
®E .188 
(.190) 
-.283 
(-.336) 
:o 
-.223 
(-.89) 
-.198 
(-.110) 
R2 
-256 .254 .227 
d 2.84 2.76 2.55 
N 28 28 28 
* t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 28 
REGRESSION COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF SINGLE WOMEN AGE 35-44, 1950-1977® 
B 
m 
.105 
(2.58)* 
.099 
(2.48)* 
.009 
(2.19)* 
\l 
.003 
(.045) 
.009 
(.249) 
.102 
(.205) 
ZB 
m 
.108 
(4.64)b* 
.108 
(4.70)b* 
-111 h 
(3.73)0 
®RWA -040 (.322) 
.081 
(.449) 
-.162 
(-1.43) 
:R .069 (3.74)* 
.072 
(3.93)* 
.055 
(3.10)* 
®E .661 
(.793) 
-.160 
(-.218) 
"o -.391 (-.186) 
-.303 
(-1.72) 
R2 
.803 .797 .771 
d 1.89 1.95 2.06 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
* Scatistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 29 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT, 
AGE 20-24, 1950-1977* 
B .065 .089 .293 
m (1.19) (1.67) (1.16) 
B . .283 .206 .062 
(3.25)* (2.76)* (3.47)* 
ZB -348 ,. .296 .354 
(15.88)0 (I2.01)B (17.22)B 
B -2.02 -1.62 -2.02 
(-4.42)* (-3.40)* (-4.47)* 
-2.88 -2.58 2.94 
(2.34)* (1.88) (3.47)* 
B -1.97 -1.78 
(-1.57) (-1.49) 
Bq .232 .088 
(.610) (.232) 
B 1.80 1.80 1.80 
^ (6.19)* (5.88)* (7.89)* 
EL -1.94 -1.74 -1.98 
(-7.92)* (-8.08)* (-8.47)* 
r2 .992 .991 .992 
d 2.8 2.55 2.81 
N 28 28 28 
* t-statistics are in parentheses, 
^ F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 30 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT, 
AGE 25-34, 1950-1977 
B -.028 -.055 -.04 
° (-.339) (-.674) (-.477) 
B -.191 -.151 -.243 
™ (-2.24)* (-1.73) (-2.71)* 
ZBg -.217 -.206 -.283 
(3.96)b (3.18)b (6.08)%* 
B .807 .807 1.21 
(1.75) (1.79) (3.72)* 
B -.005 .001 .040 
^ (-.124) (.031) (1.08) 
B 2.95 4.51 
(1.86) (2.91)* 
B 1.33 1.83 
(2.20)* (3.20)* 
B —.600 —.600 —.180 
^ (-1.17) (-1.14) (-.686) 
B .101 -.013 .758 
(.144) (-.016) (1.09) 
r2 .979 .975 .973 
d 1.16 1.09 1.12 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
'fc 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 31 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT, 
AGE 35-44, 1950-1977* 
B 
m 
-.123 
(-.195) 
-.031 
(-.479) 
-.034 
(-.500) 
\l .059 (.923) 
.089 
(1.35) 
.022 
(.302) 
IB 
m 
.046 , 
(.281)^ 
.059 
(.378)b 
.012 
(.021)b 
^RWA 
-.040 
(-.162) 
-.008 
(-.026) 
.404 
(1.49) 
:R .015 (.486) 
.020 
(.629) 
.046 
(1.54) 
2.15 
(1.77) 
3.41 
(2.85)* 
1.05 
(2.29)* 
1.42 
(3.29)* 
V .600 (1.3) .600 (1.21) .600 (1.55) 
-- 274 
(-.521) 
-. 360 
(-.654) 
. 226 
(.430) 
R2= 
.978 .975 .972 
d 1.01 .947 1.03 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses.. 
^ F-statistics. 
•k 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 32 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF OTHER MARITAL STATUS WOMEN AGE 20-24, 1950-1977* 
B 
m 
.123 
(.109) 
.022 
(.188) 
.123 
(.106) 
"ml .234 (1.67) 
.216 
(1.72) 
.216 
(1.67_ 
.246 
(2.11)b 
.237 
(2.10)° 
.228 
(2.09)b 
®KHA —. 808 (-.915) 
-.808 
(.592) 
— .404 
(-.885) 
.052 
(.888) 
.049 
(.873) 
.062 
(1.25) 
"E — .861 (-.325) 
-.418 
(-.185) 
"o 
.274 
(.340) 
.014 
(.211) 
"ADO 1.11 (1.94) 
1.06 
(1.95) 
1.16 
(2.34)* 
-. 082 
(-.200) 
-. 035 
(-.093) 
007 
(-.022) 
R2 .710 .708 .708 
d 2.23 2.18 2.18 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 33 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF OTHER MARITAL STATUS WOMEN AGE 25-34, 1950-1977 
B 
n 
.034 
(.322) 
-.009 
(-.071) 
.031 
(.332) 
\l 
-.015 
(-.148) 
.043 
(.389) 
-.022 
(-.198) 
.018 
(.019) 
.034 
(.054) 
.009 
(.0099) 
®RWA -.162 
(-.328) 
-.404 
(-.322) 
-.121 
(-.302) 
-.005 
(-.107) 
.008 
(.153) 
-.001 
(-.033) 
3.68 
(1.75) 
3.79 
(1.97) 
®0 .120 
(146) 
.629 
(.783) 
^ADC -423 (.850) 
.581 
(1.13) 
.423 
(.982) 
& -1.56 (-2.24)* -1.71 (-2.35)* -1.49 (-3.12)* 
R2 .668 .614 .667 
d 1.84 1.79 1.82 
N 28 28 28 
a t-statistics are in parentheses. 
b 
F-statistics. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
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TABLE 34 
ELASTICITY COEFFICIENTS FOR THE LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 
OF OTHER MARITAL STATUS WOMEN AGE 35-44, 1950-1977^ 
B 
m 
.034 
(.694) 
.028 
(.616) 
.015 
(.734) 
^ml .022 (.509) 
.031 
(.705) 
.009 
(.199) 
.055 
(.807)b 
.059 
(.898)b 
.025 
(.179)b 
®RWA .0404 
(.124) 
.0404 
(.123) 
.162 
(.751) 
.003 
(.149) 
.005 
(.239) 
.018 
(.969) 
.443 
(.499) 
.849 
(.998) 
®0 .490 
(1.32) 
.55 
(1.66) 
®ADC -1.06 
(-.586) 
-1.06 
(-.52) 
0 
(-.011) 
-.661 
(-2.37)* 
-.676 
(-2.48)* 
-.380 
(-1.98) 
R2 
.471 .464 .419 
d 1.87 1.79 1.82 
N 28 28 28 
^ t-statistics are in parentheses. 
^ F-statistic. 
* 
Statistically significant at 5% level. 
TABLE 35 
SUMMARY STATISTICS FOR THE QUARTERLY DATA-MEANS 
1949-75 1950-77 1954-69 1954-75 1954-77 1963-75 1963-77 
L/P 
white 
nonwhite 
.399 .393 .404 
.369 
.499 
.404 
.507 
.391 
.506 
.423 
E/P 
white 
nonwhite 
.369 .374 .364 
.363 
.459 
.387 
.463 
.373 
.462 
.400 
FT/E 
PT/E 
.793 
.207 
.793 
.207 
labor force 
white 
nonwhite 
23,081 22,227 
19,220 
2,964 
24,451 
20,056 
3,254 
27,318 
employment 
white 
nonwhite 
19,456 21,074 
18,678 
2,578 
23,136 
20,401 
2,868 
25,885 
full time 
part time 
29,048 
5,401 
minimum wage 
m 
R 
32.01 
1.20 
31.5 
1.25 
34.45 
1.28 
33.7 37.01 
TABLE 35 (Continued) 
1949-75 1950-77 1954-69 1954-75 1954-77 1963-75 1963-77 
unemployment 
children 
.0306 
.210 
.0306 
.206 
.0315 
.215 
.0303 
.199 
.0315 
.203 
.0258 
.190 
.0273 
.195 
141a 
TABLE 36 
SUMMARY STATISTICS ANNUAL DATA-MEANS 
L/P E/P 
single .493 .461 
married, husband present .345 -341 
other .401 .376 
age 20-24 
single .720 
married, husband present .398 
other .571 
age 25-34 
single 
married, husband 
other 
.816 
present .335 
.605 
age 35-44 
single .772 
married, husband present .409 
other .892 
Mw 30.8 
Hy 6001 
u .0306 
K .837 
RWA 4037 
ADC 528.27 
0 .3125 
Pjj 102.6 
E 12.3 
141b 
TABLE 37 
SYMBOLS 
M - B.L.S. minimum wage 
R - real minimum wage 
D - unemployment 
K - presence of children 
C - coverage rate 
RWA - median annual real fulitime female income 
R - first quarter unenç>loyment (annual) 
E - median female eduactional attainment 
0 - occupational mix 
Hy - median annual real income of husband 
ADC - average annual real welfare payment 
142 
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